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VOL.) NO. 12 AUGUST 1943

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON D. C

Military Intelligence Service Intelligence Bulletin

War Department No. 12

Washington, August 1943 MIS 461

NOTICE

The Intelligence Bulletin is designed primarily for the use of
junior officers and enlisted men. It is a vehicle for the dissemi-
nation to them of the latest information received from Military
Intelligence sources. In order to secure the widest possible use
of this bulletin, its contents are not highly classified. It is for
the exclusive use of military personnel, however, and no part of it
may be published without the consent of the Military Intelli-
gence Service, except in the case of task forces, divisions, and
higher echelons. Commanders of these organizations are auth-
orized to reproduce any item in the bulletin, provided they
maintain the classification of the information and give its source.

It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin be utilized
whenever practicable as a basis for informal talks and discus-
sions with troops.

Readers are invited to comment on the use that they are mak-
ing of the Intelligence Bulletin and to forward suggestions for
future issues. Such correspondence may be addressed directly to
the Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Service, War
Department, Washington, D. C. Requests for additional copies
should be forwarded through channels for approval.

538861“— 43 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part One: Germany

Page

Section I. U. S. Wounded Discuss Axis Mines and Booby Traps.. 1

1. Introduction 1

2. Comments by U. S. Wounded 1

II. Tellermines, “S” Mines, and Notes on Their Use 7

1. Tellermines (Four Types) 7

a. Teller-mine No. 1 7

b. Tellermine No. 9

c. Tellermine No. S 10

d. Tellermine No. 4 11

e. Comparison _ 13

2. "S” Mine 13

a. To Arm 13

b. To Neutralize 15

3. Notes on Tactical Use of Mines 15

III. Tank Hunting . 19

1. Combat Principles 19

2. Tank-Hunting Weapons and Their Use 23

a. Blinding Agents 24

b. Incendiary Agents 24

c. Explosives 26

d. Crowbars and Hatchets 31

3. Assault Decoration 32

IV. Engineer Assault Tactics . 33

1. Introduction 33

2. Attacks on Pillboxes 33

a. Composition of Detachment _ 33

b. Assault Tactics 34

3. Attacks on Trenches 36

V. Miscellaneous 38

1. Instructions in Case of Capture 38

2. Prisoners’ Ruse 40

3. Use of Roving Guns 40

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part Two: Italy

Page

Section I. B2, S. C. G. At Mine and B4 Antipersonnel Mine 42

1. B2, S. C. G. Antitank Mine 42

a. Characteristics 42

b. To Neutralize 42

2. B4 Antipersonnel Mine 44

a. Characteristics 44

b. To Neutralize 44

II. Notes on Attack 46

1. Introduction 46

2. The Notes 46

a. During Attack 47

b. When Objective Has Been Gained 47

c. During Rest Periods 47

Part Three: Japan

Section I. American Wounded Tell About Japanese on Attu 48

1. Introduction 48

2. The Interviews 48

II. Notes on How Japanese Attack Pillboxes 54

1. Introduction 54

2. Organization, and Attack Duties 55

3. Weapons and Equipment 55

a. Assault Han 56

b. Assisting Fire-power Detachment 56

c. Mopping-up han 56

4. Methods of Attack 57

a. Assisting Fire-power Detachment 57

b. Assault Han 57

c. Mopping-up Han 58

d. Machine-Gun or Engineer Detachment 58

e. Night Attacks 59

f. Assistance by Other Troops 59

5. Destruction by Bombardment 60

III. Defense Techniques 61

1. Positions 61

2. Weapons 62

3. Tactics in Combat 63

IV. Notes on Japanese Security Measures 65

1. Introduction 65

2. General Supervision 65

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

3. Precautions 67

a. In Handling Classified Matter 67

b. Regarding Military Personnel 67

c. Regarding Inspections and Censorship 68

d. In Dealing with Civilians 69

e. Regarding Foreigners 70

4. Examples of Violations 70

Part Four: United Nations

Section I. How the British Deal With Road Craters, Obstacles 72

1. Introduction 72

2. Craters 72

a. Dry Craters 72

b. Wet Craters 74

3. Other Road Obstacles 74

II. British Junior Officer Tells Combat Experiences. _ 75

1. Introduction 75

2. “Tips from the Front” 75

III. Description of British Antipersonnel Switch 80

1. Introduction 80

2. Description 80

3. Operation 80

4. Assembly and Testing 82

5. Concealment 82

Index for Vol. I, Nob. 1-12 83

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Tellermine (German antitank) No. 1 8

Figure 2. Tellermine No. 1 (cross section) 8

Figure 3. Tellermine No. 2 10

Figure 4. Tellermine No. 3 II

Figure 5. Tellermine No. 4 — 12

Figure 6. “S” (German antipersonnel) Mine 14

Figures 7-15. Sketches Illustrating German Tank-hunting Tactics

and Weapons 22, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31

Figure 16. German Assault Decoration 32

Figure 17. B2, S. C. G. (Italian antitank) Mine 43

Figure 18. B4 (Italian antipersonnel) Mine 45

Figure 19. Switch (British antipersonnel) 81

Part One : Germany

Section I. U. S. WOUNDED DISCUSS AXIS
MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

1. INTRODUCTION

A number of U. S. soldiers, who were wounded by
Axis land mines and booby traps during the Tunisian
campaign, have made interesting and useful comments
based on their experiences with such devices. The
following extracts from their remarks should be re-
garded as supplementary to three articles which have
appeared in previous issues of this publication: “Booby
Traps” ( Intelligence Bulletin No. 1), “Minefields in
Desert Terrain” ( Intelligence Bulletin No. 5), and
“Recent Trends in the Use of Mines and Booby Traps”
(. Intelligence Bulletin No. 10).

2. COMMENTS BY U. S. WOUNDED

We had laid a good many British Mark V mines in the ap-
proach to Faid Pass. The Germans, realizing that we were about
to lift our own minefield, sneaked up at night and booby-trapped
the mines on the edges nearest them with antilifting devices.

When the Germans lay their “bouncing babies” [“S” mines] 1
in shell holes and craters, they generally set the mines for pressure.

1 Several of the most widely used types of enemy mines, including the “S”
mine, are described and illustrated in this issue. See pp. S-19, 29-31, and
43-46.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

What the enemy hopes is that our boys will hastily jump into
the holes to take cover, without even suspecting the presence of
mines. It doesn’t take our men very long to learn that the
enemy is always trying to outguess us, that he’s smart, and that
caution pays.

I’d like to say something about “double bluffs,” as we call them.
You see something which looks like a trip wire, and which would
ordinarily lead to a pull-igniter. The wire is taut. Also, it’s out
in full view — suspiciously so. If you cut the wire, a hammer sets
off a charge of some kind — perhaps not a mine at all. It’s just
another instance of the enemy trying to outguess us.

You’ve probably heard about the German “butterfly bombs.”2
A shallow foxhole usually affords sufficient protection against
butterfly bombs, but who digs a shallow foxhole any more when
he has time to dig a deep one ? That’s one thing I’ve certainly
learned — to dig deeper and feel safer.

An important point to remember about enemy methods is that
they aren’t cut-and-dried. You can’t depend on the Axis always
doing the same thing, day in and day out. The enemy goes in
for variety to catch us off our guard.

1 can certify that going blindly up a gully which may be the
wrong one is a damn fool stunt! The reason I lost a leg is
simply this : I didn’t pick out landmarks carefully enough in the
daytime, and when I was retracing some ground in a jeep at
night, I deviated just a little from a route I’d gone over only
once before. I was heading for a certain gully. Instead of being
absolutely sure that I was entering the right one, I took a
chance and entered what I vaguely guessed was the right gully.

2 Butterfly bombs are dropped in a container which holds 23 bombs and
which is fuzed to open after falling a predetermined distance from a plane.
Each butterfly bomb, in turn, is fitted with one of three types of fuzes: (1)
A fuze designed to operate while the bomb is still in the air, or on impact ;
(2) a clockwork fuze which can be set to function at any time up to 30
minutes after the bomb becomes armed; (3) a highly sensitive antihandling
(booby trap) fuze which becomes armed on impact, but does not detonate
until subsequently disturbed.

GERMANY — U. S. WOUNDED DISCUSS AXIS MINES 3

A Tellermine got the jeep, and it got me, too. What I should
have done was to go back a bit and get my bearings.

If I were to go through the North African campaign again, I’d
train myself better in using my eyes at night,2 and I’d form the
habit of noting landmarks more carefully during the daytime.
Even though a lot of terrain features are lost at night, there’s
always a good chance that a remembered landmark will remind
you of the position of another, in relation to it.

If you see a sign saying Aektung! Minen! or “Attention!
Mines !”, that’s one time when you want to believe in signs ! We
learned not to play the smart-aleck game of firing or throwing
stones at objects in an area where there was a warning sign.
This kind of tomfoolery sometimes disturbed delicate mines and
booby trap mechanisms so that they were harder to detect and
neutralize later. Also, there was an ever-present danger of
“sympathetic detonation,” whereby one explosion would cause
another — and of course you couldn’t predict where.

I lost my right hand by picking up a German “egg” grenade
that I saw lying on the ground, with its pin apparently in.
Feeling confident that it was safe, I went right ahead and picked
it up. It hadn’t occurred to me that fine piano wire might lead
from the other end of the grenade to a stake sunk into the
ground directly underneath.

Something even worse happened to a British squad leader I
knew over in Tunisia. The squad came across a nice German
Luger [semiautomatic pistol] lying on the ground, just waiting to
be picked up. The squad leader was wary. He said, “It’s prob-
ably booby-trapped. I want all you men to stand aside and
watch carefully while I show you a safe way of testing it.” He
tied a cord to the trigger guard, and carried the other end of
the string over to a foxhole, which was about 15 or 20 feet
away. “Now here’s what I’m going to do”, he said. “I’ll crouch

8 The reader Is referred to “How to Use Your Eyes at Night,” Intelligence
Bulletin No. 6, p. 66.

538861“ — 43— ; 2

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

in the foxhole, and draw the cord so that the Luger will move
and detonate any pull-igniter which may be attached to it,”

The squad leader jumped into the foxhole, and instantly there
was an explosion. The Germans, anticipating just what his line
of reasoning would be, had mined the foxhole with a couple of
“bouncing babies” set for pressure and, incidently, hadn’t even
bothered to booby-trap the Luger at all.

I’d like to say something very frankly to fellows who haven’t
yet had experience in fighting the Germans. Everybody in my
outfit will back me up in this, too. Remember that the enemy
is just as smart as you are, and possibly smarter. Don’t be care-
less— this is just what the Germans hope you will be. And
don’t form the habit of showing off, either. Cockiness can be
the curse of green troops.

When the Germans abandon a gun position, they are likely
not to lift the mines surrounding it. Instead, the enemy leaves
them there for us to stumble onto, later on.

The Germans think ahead. They try to anticipate what we’ll
do under every circumstance. If our fellows take this fact into
account every minute, and move as surely and as carefully as
Indians, they aren’t going to be caught unaware.

It’s true about Tellermines being laid in the shoulders of
roads, especially where vehicles are likely to swerve out some-
what, as on turns. I was the guard in a jeep that got blown up
that way. Two men were killed, and I lost my right leg and
my left foot. I’d been over the road once before, but it tvas
the driver’s first time. There’s a possibility that the mine had
been laid at night by a German slipping back into our territory,
but of course it may have been there all the time. We went over
on the shoulder as we rounded a curve, going a little too fast.

Our M3 tanks were advancing across a plain, and were en-
gaged in hot and heavy action. A Tellermine got the left track
of my tank. None of us realized that the track had been

GERMANY — U. S. WOUNDED DISCUSS AXIS MINES

smashed; we didn’t notice this particular explosion, and we
weren’t thrown against the sides of the tank or anything like
that. We were in the heat of battle, and were firing continu
ously. I tried to back off to execute a maneuver, and only
then did I realize that the track was broken and off. At this
point we were hit by an 88 and were set on fire. I gave the
order to abandon the tank. The driver was wounded as he was
climbing out.

A couple of minutes later I was lying on my belly, keeping as
well down as possible and trying to dress the driver’s wound.
He was lying on his back. There was a hell of a lot of action
going on. More than ever. I happened to move my leg just a
little, and it may have caught a wire which detonated an anti-
personnel mine. I hadn’t noticed any wire, because I’d been so
busy trying to dress the driver’s wound and meanwhile avoid all
the fire which was going on overhead. Maybe the pressure of
my foot or leg would have been enough to detonate a pressure-
type igniter — even while I was lying prone. I’m not sure about
this.

[Note. — It is entirely possible. The soldier in question is heavy-set, and,
when he shifted his leg, he may have brought it down on the igniter with
considerable force.]

The terrain was characterized by sandy stretches and grass
clumps. Even though I was in a mighty hot spot, I wish now
that I’d investigated the ground in that immediate neighborhood
for trip wires, or for those little three-pronged igniters that
stick up just above the ground, or for suspicious signs of any
kind. When I realized that a Tellermine had got our tank
track, I should have had sense enough to suspect the presence of
antipersonnel mines, too. The Germans very often lay “S’s”
and other antipersonnel types near their “T’s.”

I don’t want to sound at all boastful, but up until this time I
hadn’t felt nervous, and honestly I still didn’t. Perhaps it was
because so much hell was popping that no one thing had a de-
moralizing effect. Anyway, when the mine got my foot — it put

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

a good many fragments here and there in both legs, too — I had
to leave the driver and start crawling back across the plain. I
crawled back more than a mile. I kept looking for buried
mines, too, believe me ! Eventually I was discovered by a British
tank.

The Germans use mines so liberally, especially when they’re
on the defensive, that you’ve got to suspect every inch of terrain.
I’m not trying to make a high-sounding statement for effect,
I’m speaking literally !

The Germans mine natural tank runs. During a withdrawal
they are especially likely to lay Tellermines in positions that
afford good defilade for tanks.

By and large, you won’t find booby traps in places that are
inaccessible. If you make your own trail, you’re likely to be a
lot safer.

We soon learned to leave suspicuous-looking objects alone and
notify the engineers. Once my platoon worked for the better part
of a day in a little clearing, paying absolutely no attention to a
beautiful silver watch that lay on the ground right smack in the
middle of it. When we finally left the clearing, the engineers
still hadn’t come up. Even so, we left the watch lying there.
Don’t think we didn’t arrive at this state of discipline through
experience, though !

In paths and defiles the Germans used a number of antiper-
sonnel switches that they had captured from the British. An
antipersonnel switch is a pressure-release device, shaped like a
pencil.4 It usually is sunk in a path or narrow defile and its 94-
inch tip concealed with mud, dirt, or leaves. It projects a bullet
upwards. Our nickname for these switches is “castrators” — but
most of the time what they really do is go up through your foot,
or through the tire of a vehicle.

4 For furtlier details about the British antipersonnel switch, with a sketch,
see pp. 80-82.

Section II. TELLERMINES, “S" MINES,
AND NOTES ON THEIR USE

1. TELLERMINES (FOUR TYPES)

The German Tellermine 1 is widely used against
tanks and other vehicles. References to the tactical em-
ployment of this weapon have appeared frequently in
the Intelligence Bulletin (see index, p. 83). To
date, four different versions of the mine have been
encountered.

a. Tellermine No. 1 (see tigs. 1 and 2)

This circular mine, which contains 11 pounds of
TNT, is about 1 foot in diameter. It has a slightly
dome-shaped lid, from the center of which the top of
the striker mechanism projects. The mine is detonated
by a weight of about 300 pounds. As secondary firing
devices, for booby trapping, pull igniters may be
screwed into the sockets in the side (opposite the
handle) and bottom of the base.

(1) To Arm. — Turn the screw on top of the igniter
so that the white dot on it is moved opposite the white

1 Teller is the German word for “plate,” and is intended to suggest the ap-
pearance of the mine. To many Americans, however, the weapon looks
more like the lid of an old-fashioned ice cream freezer.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

mark ( Sicker — safe) to the red mark ( Scharf —
danger). After burying the mine or concealing it
with appropriate camouflage, withdraw the safety pin
by means of the wire attached to it.

Figure 1. — Tellermine (German antitank) No. 1.

(2) To Neutralize.

(a) With finger and thumb, gently try to push the
safety bolt all the way in. If the bolt will not go in
easily, leave it alone.

(b) Turn the screw on the igniter so that the red
dot is opposite the white mark ( Sicker ). If it will
not turn easily, leave it alone.

GERMANY TELLERMINES, “S'' MINES

(e) Since the mine may be booby-trapped, do not
attempt to lift it by hand until you have neutralized
the side and bottom igniters (if they are present).
Carefully find the handle of the mine, and then
neutralize the igniter on the opposite side. Find the
bottom igniter, which is about halfway between the
handle and the center, and neutralize it.

(3) Comments.

(a) If the mine has been fought over or subjected
to blast, or if the safety bolt or screw on the igniter
offers resistance, unscrew the igniter from the mine.
Push home the safety bolt, turn the safety screw to
Sicker, and replace the igniter in the mine. If the
safety bolt will not go in, or if the screw will not turn,
the igniter is unsafe and must not be put back in the
mine.

(b) If the risk of detonation can be accepted, the
precautions outlined in (c), above, may be omitted,
and the mine may be pulled clear of its position by
means of a 50-yard length of signal cable tied to the
handle.

b. Tellermine No. 2 (see fig. 3)

This mine, which is similar to Tellermine No. 1,
is circular in shape and about 1 foot in diameter, has
a slightly dome-shaped cover, and is painted dark
gray. It contains 12 pounds of TNT. Tellermine
No. 2 differs, however, in that its pressure plate is
fluted and covers only about half of the top of the
mine ; also the main igniter is intended to be slid, rather
than screwed, into its socket.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Figure 3. — Tellermine No. 2.

The pull-igniter sockets are in positions different
from those in Tellermine No. 1. The side socket is
4 inches from the handle, and not opposite it. The
bottom socket is 2 inches from the center.

(1) To Arm.

(a) Unscrew the six-sided nut, and push in the
igniter assembly, together with its detonator. The
latter should be attached to the bottom of the igniter.

(2) To Neutralize.

(a) Unscrew the six-sided nut.

(b) Remove the igniter and detonator.

c. Tellermine No. 3 (see fig. 4)

This also is similar to Tellermine No. 1, but has a
fluted top and is adapted to take either the German
standard brass igniter or the igniter assembly of
Tellermine No. 2. In this latter case, after the igniter

GERMANY TELLERMINES, “S” MINES

assembly has been inserted, the screw cap is re-
placed on top. (This mine has also been found with
a screwed ‘‘adaptor,” instead of the cap.) The addi-
tional igniter sockets are situated as in Tellermine
No. 1.

Figure 4. — Tellermine No. 3.

d. Tellermine No. 4 (see fig. 5)

The chief difference between this and the other
Tellermine is that the cover plate of the No. 4, which
is 7% inches in diameter and painted black, is entirely
separate from the body. Neither the cover nor the
body is fluted. The additional igniter sockets are
situated as in Tellermine No. 2.

538801° — 43 3

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

The mine functions when pressure on the cover plate
crushes it down on the igniter, which is like that of the
Tellermine No. 2.

(1) To Arm .

(a) Unscrew the cover plate.

(b) Insert the igniter assembly.

Figure 5. — Tellermine No. 4.

(2) To Neutralize.

(a) Examine the mine for additional igniters, and
neutralize them.

(b) Unscrew" the pressure plate, and remove the
igniter assembly.

GERMANY TELLERMINES, “S” MINES

e. Comparison

The. pressure plates on Tellermines No. 1 and No. 3
extend over the entire top of the mines, but the pressure
plates on Tellermines No. 2 and No. 4 cover only the
center portion of the mine. Accordingly, a tank might
pass over the edge or rim of Tellermines No. 2 and
No. 4 without detonating the mines, whereas the same
load passing over the edge or rim of Tellermines No. 1
and No. 3 would detonate the mines. It is possible for
a spread-out load of fairly low intensity covering the
whole top of Tellermines No. 1 and No. 3 to detonate
them, while a heavier and more concentrated load is
necessary to detonate Tellermines No. 2 and No. 4.

2. "S" MINE2 (see fig. 6)

This antipersonnel mine, widely known to U. S.
soldiers as the “bouncing baby,” is cylindrical, and
about 5 inches high and 4 inches in diameter. When
it is fired, it is projected from 3 to 5 feet into the air,
where it explodes and scatters approximately 350 steel
balls in all directions. Sometimes the mine is filled
with small diamond-shaped pieces of steel, instead.

a. To Arm

Unscrew the plugs and insert three standard non-
electric detonators, open end downwards, in the deto-
nator tubes. Replace and screw in the plugs. Remove
the screw cap, and screw any of the three types of
igniters on the tube, making sure that the safety pins

Schutsmine — protective mine.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Figure 6. — “S” (German antipersonnel) Mine.

GERMANY — TELLERMINES, “S" MINES 15

are in place. Finally, after the mine has been laid,
remove tlie safety pins.

b. To Neutralize

The method of neutralizing an “S'” mine depends
on the type of igniter with which it has been armed.
The most common method of arming is with the stand-
ard 3-prong pressure igniter. Another method is that
of using one or two standard pull-igniters. When
these are used, an adaptor is fitted. A third method
is that of using the 3-prong pressure igniter (electric).

(1) With Standard 3-Prong Pressure Igniter. —
Insert a nail into the safety pin hole, and unscrew the
igniter.

(2) With Standard Pull-igniters. — Insert a nail
into the safety pin hole, and cut the trip wires. Un-
screw the igniters. Inspect the other end of each trip
wire for other “S” mines or booby traps.

(3) With 3-Prong Pressure Igniters (Electric). —
On finding a 3-prong pressure igniter (electric) with a
wire leading away from it, trace the lead until you
find the “S” mine. Cut all wires leading from the
mine. The Germans often lay a number of these
electric igniters within effective radius of a single mine.

3. NOTES ON TACTICAL USE OF MINES

The following instructions dealing with certain as-
pects of the tactical use of land mines have been ex-
tracted from a German Army training document. The
instructions apply mainly to German use of these de-
vices in retreats and withdrawals.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

a. The use of land mines may enable even a weak defending
force to maintain its positions.

b. ‘‘Wild” minelaying may hinder our own troops; there-
fore, “planned” laying is essential.

c. The decision to lay mines is made, and the tactical pur-
pose of minefields is decided on, by divisional or higher com-
mands. Commands of smaller, independent units may also
make such decisions in an emergency. Repair of damaged mine-
fields may be ordered by sector commanders, and is a task for
the engineers.

In an emergency — for example, in defense against tank break-
throughs— Tellermines (only) may be laid by any commander
responsible for holding a position.

d. Tellermines are primarily for use against tanks; “S” mines
are primarily for use against personnel. “S” mines may be
negotiated by tanks without danger to their crews.

For all purposes — against tanks, motor transport and other
vehicles, and personnel — improvised mines may be used. These
are exploded by pressure, trip wires, or the cutting of taut wires,

e. Mine plans will be drawn up for every minefield. These
will clearly show the types of mines employed. In doubtful
cases, the types of igniters will be shown.

The careful drawing of mine plans is the duty of the unit
responsible for laying the mines.

Mine maps are also very important. These are large-scale
maps ( 1 : 10,000 or 1 : 25,000) showing the whole layout of the
minefields. In addition, for each minefield or each instance of
scattered minelaying (such as the mining of roads and paths)
a plan 1 : 2,500 must be drawn up, giving the exact position of
the minefields and the number and types of mines employed, to-
gether with map references and distances. Every corner or gap
must be pin-pointed by the use of two references.

The headquarters responsible for the laying of the mines
will forward mine maps to its superior headquarters, up to and
including Army headquarters, and down to battalions.

GERMANY TELLE RMINES, "S" MINES 17

Mine plans will be sent to the engineer battalion, Army head-
quarters, and Engineer Directorate at the Oberkommando des
He&res (High Command of the Army). Full details, in writing,
must be handed over to relieving units. The relieving unit has
the right to ask for a handing-over party to show the minefield
on the ground. Arming pins and safety pins must also be held
by the engineer battalion concerned, and must be handed over
similarly.

f. The headquarters responsible for ordering the laying of
mines will also give orders as to whether they are to be armed
or not, according to the situation. In any case, it must always
be possible to arm a minefield at a moment’s notice.

g. Minefields containing Tellermines which are laid for long
periods, whether armed or not, must always be fenced if they
are within our [German] main battle position. When the
minefields are in our advance area, they should be fenced in a
manner similar to the rest of the wiring in no-man’s land.

It has been found useful to lay, at the same time, strands of
ordinary wire connecting with our own positions. These strands
serve to guide our own patrols when they crawl forward.

Minefields containing “S” mines must, at all times, be fenced
against accidental entry by our own troops. Such fences should
be unobtrusive, and should be changed frequently.

If “T” mines are used in “S” minefields, they should be laid
on the edge of the field facing the enemy or on the flanks. This
hinders the enemy from neutralizing the minefield by driving
over it with his tanks. If time allows, the “T” mines may be
armed against removal by a pull-igniter underneath.

“S” mines laid in “T” minefields should be laid in blocks, with
regular intervals between blocks and between mines.

Unauthorized laying of “T” and “S” mines is forbidden.

h. If minefields have been fired over or passed over by ve-
hicles, personnel will experience certain difficulties in lifting the
mines, and in such minefields the following mines should be
detonated :

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(1) Those which have been moved from their original posi-
tions.

(2) Those which have been damaged.

(3) Those with mechanisms which resist disarming, even to a
slight degree.

The mines in irregularly laid minefields of any type will be
donated.

Section III. TANK HUNTING

1. COMBAT PRINCIPLES

In all branches of the German Army, outstanding
soldiers are chosen to serve as members of tank-hunt-
ing squads. These squads, each consisting of a leader
and at least three men, are given special training.
Like the eombat engineers, they are continually ready
for close-in combat with tanks and other armored
vehicles.1 When a need arises, squads are combined
into tank-hunting groups. In general, the Germans
use tank hunters if there are no armor-piercing weap-
ons at hand, or if the tire of these weapons fails to
prove effective against attacking tank forces.

The equipment for close-in tank hunting consists
of incendiary bottles, Tellermines, TUT, automatic
weapons (both German and captured), submachine
guns, Very pistols, hand grenades, smoke grenades and
candles, flame throwers, crowbars, hatchets, and camou-
flage material.

It is a German principle that hostile tanks and
infantry must be separated so that they may be de-
stroyed more easily. If armor-piercing weapons are
available, their fire is directed against the approaching

'For simplification, this article will hereafter mention tanks only.

5388(31 ° — 43 4 19

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

tanks, while the remaining weapons are used pri-
marily against the infantry accompanying the tanks.
Infantry riding on tanks are destroyed before the tank
hunters attempt to assault the vehicles. If the tanks
arrive without infantry, the fire of all available weap-
ons is concentrated against the vulnerable parts of the
tank, to create conditions favorable for close-in as-
sault. If this fire support by other weapons is im-
possible, the tank-hunting squads proceed without it.

The carrying-out of close-in combat largely depends
on the immediate situation. The number, types, and
tactics of the attacking tanks, the terrain, the Germans ’
own position, and the effect of German defensive fire
always vary, and the tank hunters attempt to meet
this variation by showing adaptability and maneuvera-
bility. A tank-hunting squad assaults only one tank
at a time. If several tanks attack together, and if
only one tank-hunting squad is available, the squad
assaults that tank which appears to be the most
dangerous at the moment, or which promises the
quickest success if attacked. If enough squads are
available, the Germans make an effort — especially in
defense — to hold one or more squads ready, in the
rear, to assault tanks which break through.

The general procedure for tank hunters is: first, to
blind the tank, then to halt it, and finally to destroy the
vehicle and its crew in close-in combat.

Whether the tank hunters advance at the beginning
of a tank attack, whether they remain in their fox-
holes until just before the assault, or whether they
conduct the entire assault from under cover depends

GERMANY TANK HUNTING

entirely on the situation. The foxholes are narrow,
and have no parapets; this makes them harder to
identify. They are well camouflaged with local brush
and, whenever possible, are surrounded by a belt of
Tellermines. (In village fighting, the corners of
houses, and even bushes and fences, serve as hiding
places from which tank hunters make their close-in
assaults.) Obstacles of all kinds, dummy mines and
guns, and signs saying “Warning! Mines!” are used
to lead hostile tanks into terrain unfavorable for
them, but tactically advantageous for the assault
squads and antitank weapons.

The tactics employed by tank hunters of course
depend to a considerable extent on whether the tanks
are moving, or have halted voluntarily or involuntarily.

When preparing to attack a moving tank, the tank
hunters, remaining well concealed, permit the tank
to come close to them (20 to 7 yards). Then, by
blinding the tank, they try to halt it or at least slow
it down. By using explosive charges, the tank-hunting
squad makes an effort to destroy the tracks of the
tank and cripple it. The final step is to assault the
tank, and destroy it and its crew.2 In the case of a
halted tank, the squad stalks up on it, using the
terrain to the best possible advantage.

Around every tank there is a “dead space” which
it cannot cover with its principal weapons. The
higher a tank, the larger, as a rule, is its dead
space. In general, the radius of dead space from

a Close-in combat weapons and how the Germans use them in the “Blind,
halt, and destroy” procedure are discussed in paragraph 2 of this section.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

the turret gun is about 20 yards; from the machine
gun, about 10 yards (see fig. 7). To combat targets

in the dead space, tanks have slits through which
pistols and submachine guns can be fired. When
assaulting a tank, German tank hunters make all
possible use of the dead space. They try to approach
a tank from the direction opposite the direction of
its principal weapons. This is also opposite the
direction of its principal observation (see fig. 8).

GERMANY— TANK HUNTING

The tank hunter with the principal close-in weapon
uses it against the tank while the other tank hunters
support him with their tire. If' he is hampered by
this tire, the others cease. If members of the tank
crew, becoming aware of the assault, open the turret
hatch in order to defend themselves with hand gre-
nades, the tank hunters seize this moment to fire
against the open turret and wound the crew. German
doctrine states that crews of stalled or burning tanks
who do not surrender when getting out will be de-
stroyed in close combat. If the tanks are still
undamaged, the Germans render them useless by
removing the guns’ breech blocks, by damaging the
guns, and by setting tire to the gasoline tanks.

2. TANK-HUNTING WEAPONS AND THEIR USE

The tank-hunting squad is equipped with blinding,
incendiary, and explosive materials. (Some of these
serve a double purpose. For example, flame throwers
are used not only as incendiary agents, but as blind-
ing agents.) The type of armored vehicle, its position,
and the terrain determine which of the available
weapons are to be used and how the employment of
several may be combined. The leader of the tank-
hunting squad is obliged to decide quickly which to
adopt under the circumstances.

The following comments on these weapons and their
use have been extracted from a German Army
document.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

a. Blinding Agents

(1) Smoke Candles and Smoke Grenades . — Smoke candles or
several smoke hand grenades, thrown in front of a tank with
allowance for wind direction, interfere with its vision and force
it to slow down.

(2) Smoke. — Ordinary smoke may be used. To produce it at
the right moment, distribute straw or other highly inflammable
material in the probable avenue of approach, drench it with gas-
oline or kerosene, and ignite it with signal rockets when tanks
approach. The detonation of grenades and artillery shells also
creates clouds of smoke. Moreover, the firing of armor-piercing
grenades against the vision slits can be very effective. Smoke
should be used only when a tank has come so close that we can
no longer fire on it without endangering our own personnel and
therefore must destroy the tank at close range.

(3) Signal Rockets. — Signal rockets shot against vision slits
have a blinding effect, particularly at dusk and in total dark-
ness; also, the vehicle is illuminated for our antitank weapons.
(Note that signal rockets begin to burn only after traveling 25
yards.)

(4) Flame Throwers and Incendiary Bottles. — Flame throwers
and incendiary bottles are aimed at vision slits.

(5) Covering of Vision Slits. — For this purpose a tank hunter
jumps onto a tank, preferably from the rear, or approaches its
side, and covers the vision slits or periscopes with a blanket,
overcoat, shelter half, etc., or applies mud, paint, or grease. This
is possible only when the tank is moving slowly or has halted,
and when it is not supported by fire from accompanying tanks
or infantry. A tank crew will be especially demoralized by the
presence of an enemy on top of the tank.

b. Incendiary Agents

(1) Flame Throwers. — Flame throwers are aimed at weapon
openings and engine ventilators to set a tank afire.

(2) Incendiary Bottles. — Incendiary bottles, which ignite when

GERMANY — TANK HUNTING

they hit a hard surface and break, are thrown at engine venti-
lators, vision slits, and imperfectly closed hatches. (In street
and house fighting, they are also used against personnel.) The
bottles may be thrown in two different ways : A tank hunter may
grasp the neck of the bottle and throw it by swinging his arm.
or he may grasp the body of the bottle and pitch it as in shot-
putting. In general, the position of the thrower will determine
the type of throw. In a prone position he will not be able to
swing his arm, and therefore will have to pitch the bottle. When-
ever possible, it should be thrown like a stick hand grenade, be-
cause the accuracy of aim will be greater and the possible range
will be increased.

(3) Improvised Incendiary Bottles. — When a tank approaches,
the wick of an improvised incendiary bottle is lighted and the
bottle is thrown. When it breaks, the fluid is ignited by the wick
and is distributed over the tank and its engine. Generally the
tank catches fire. If additional bottles are to be thrown against
the tank, they need not be ignited before they are thrown. Even
initially, a bottle without an ignition device can be used. After
the bottle has broken against the tank, the liquid can be ignited
with signal rockets, hand grenades, smoke candles, smoke gre-
nades, burning torches, or burning gasoline-drenched rags.

(4) Gasoline. — Several quarts of gasoline are poured over the
engine housing of a tank, and ignited in the manner described
above. Gasoline may also be poured into the hatch, and ignited
by a hand grenade.

(5) Hand Grenades. — Often a tank crew will open the hatch
for better observation. This presents an opportunity to throw
grenades in a high arc into the interior of the tank. The crew
can thus be destroyed and the tank set afire. Sometimes it may
be possible to open the hatches with crowbars or bayonets, and
then to throw grenades into the interior.

(6) Smoke Candles or Smoke Grenades. — When smoke candles
or smoke grenades are thrown inside a tank, they may set the
tank afire, or at least force the crew to get out because of the
thick smoke.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

(7) Signal Rockets. — Signal rockets shot into open hatches
with a Very pistol may set the tank afire.

c. Explosives

(1) Hand Grenades. — Hand grenades detonated in the muzzle
of the cannon (see figs. 9 and 10) yield excellent results.

GERMANY TANK HUNTING

(2) Blasting Slab . — A slab of explosive weighing 1 kilogram
(2.2 pounds) , when placed on top of a tank, has about the same
strength as a concentrated charge of seven hand grenades and
can give the crew a severe shock. Two such concentrated charges
can damage the turret hatch considerably, and for a short time
leave the crew unable to fight because of the powerful concussion.
Two or three such charges combined into a multiple charge, and
tied on a curved board to be slid over the ground (like a ski) , can
damage the tracks so severely that they will soon break under
use. Machine-gun and cannon barrels can be destroyed by two
1-kilogram charges tied together, hung like a saddle over the top
of the barrel, and detonated. (A cannon barrel will be so bent
that an attempt to fire the gun will completely destroy it.)

(3) Concentrated, Charges. — The bodies of seven stick grenades
are tied together securely with wire. Only the middle grenade
is fitted with the usual handle, which has an internal igniter.
This charge is ineffective against the armor or tracks of heavy
tanks. But when it is exploded on top of the tank, its concus-
sion is so great that the crew is knocked out temporarily.

The concentrated charge of 3 kilograms, which is found ready
for use in the infantry engineer platoon, infantry engineer
platoon motorized, engineer companies, and engineer battalions,
will pierce about 60 mm of armor. It is best to place the charge
over the engine or the driver’s seat. The crew will be wounded by
small fragments of the inner walls spattering off. Moreover, the
concussion is unbearable.

A combination of several 3-kilogram charges is even more
effective.

The throwing radius for a concentrated charge is 10 to 15
yards. When throwing the charge, the soldier must consider the
length of the fuze (about V2 inch burns in 1 second). The
thrower aims at the tracks or at the belly of an approaching tank.

538861° — 43 5

INTBLI/IG'EN'CE BULLETIN

The concentrated charge can also be used as a multiple charge
or as a slide-mine as described in paragraph (2) above.

(4) Sliding Mines. — Charges of 3 or 6 kilograms can be built
into a two-sided skid. To secure this sliding mine against pre-
mature detonation, which can result from falling or turning
over, two woodblocks should be inserted (see fig. 11).

Figure 11.

Wood support
blocks

Two to four sliding mines are linked together, and at each end
of the group is a 20-yard cable or rope.

Tank hunters sit in two foxholes about 20 yards apart. The
sliding mines are camouflaged and are placed somewhere between
the holes so that they can be pulled in either direction. When a
tank approaches, the mines are pulled under its tracks (see fig.
12). This sliding-mine technique may be employed on a larger

Foxhole

Direction of puU

— oooo

Sliding mines

Foxhole

Tank

Figure 12.

scale by several pairs of soldiers using an extended series of
foxholes-

GERMANY TANK HUNTING

(5) TellemmAnes. — Instead of concentrated charges, Tellermines
can be used, either as multiple charges or as sliding mines (see
fig. 13). However, because they have a high radius of frag-
mentation, they can only be worked from splinter -proof positions,
(Fig. 14 illustrates the springing of a turret.)

Figure 14.

GERMANY — TANK HUNTING 31

d. Crowbars and Hatchets

Crowbars and hatchets are used to bend the barrels of machine
guns (see fig. 15).

32 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

3. ASSAULT DECORATION

Tank hunters and other German Army personnel who destroy
tanks in close-in combat are awarded an assault decoration (see
fig. 16), which is worn on the upper right sleeve.

Figure 16. — German Assault Decoration.

Section IV. ENGINEER ASSAULT TACTICS

1. INTRODUCTION

This section deals with German engineer assault
tactics developed since the battle of Crete. Since the
information has been obtained from German prisoners
of war (engineers) captured in Tunisia, it should be
accepted with the reservations customary under such
circumstances.

2. ATTACKS ON PILLBOXES

a. Composition of Detachment

An engineer assault, detachment (Pioniersturmzug) ,
whose principal task is the assaulting of pillboxes, may
be composed of any or all of the following :

(1) From two to six men with pole charges or tube
charges. (These tubes are said to be about 2 yards
long.)

(2) From one to three flame-thrower teams of two
men each. There is also said to be a third man, who
accompanies them and serves as an alternate, if needed.

(3) From one to four men with hollow charges and
explosives.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

(4) Light machine-gun covering detachments.

The engineer assault detachment in action is nor-
mally divided into two sections (Gruppen).

b. Assault Tactics

The assault is normally preceded by a concentration
of artillery fire. One purpose of this fire is to make
craters in which the advancing engineers can take
cover. When the assault detachment reaches the wire
surrounding the enemy pillbox, Very signals are fired,
calling for all available artillery fire to be placed on
the pillbox and its immediate surroundings.

It is reported that, at this point, a smoke screen is laid
by two men of the detachment, using smoke grenades
(similar to stick grenades), smoke candles, or smoke
canisters. Also, there are reports that smoke screens
are put down as soon as the artillery is compelled to
cease fire because of the proximity of the assault
troops.

Men armed with wire cutters cut a lane through the
wire obstacle, hidden by the smoke screen. As an
alternative measure, men with tube charges go forward
and push their charges under the wire. These tube
charges, which are similar to Bangalore torpedoes, con-
tain 18 to 20 pounds of explosive. When the charges
are in place, a designated engineer calls out “ Ready
for ignition!” ( Fertig zum zunden), whereupon the
commander of the obstacle-blasting party replies “All
together, ignite!” {All zusammen zunden ). The

GERMANY ENGINEER ASSAULT TACTICS

engineer then ignites the fuze and calls out “Burning!”
( Brennt ) to warn personnel nearby to get under cover.
The explosion of the tube charge opens a lane in the
wire. The engineers nearest the lane then shout “Gap
here!” (Hier Gasse ).

Besides blinding the defenders of a pillbox by means
of smoke, the 'Germans also fire antitank guns directly
at the embrasures of the pillbox.

(It seems highly probable that the shouting drill has
been developed to enable the engineers to keep in touch
with each other when visibility is poor or zero, and
because of the difficulty of commanding the whole
operation from a central command post.)

The flame-throwing detachment, having advanced
with the remainder of the assault party from crater to
crater, now moves through the gap in the wire and
attempts to reach a point 5 or 6 yards from the pillbox.

Now that artillery fire has lifted from the area
around the pillbox, the task of keeping the defenders’
heads down is taken over by covering machine guns.
The flame-thrower operators direct jets of flame at the
various embrasures in the pillbox, in accordance with
orders given before the operation began. The blinding
effect of the jets enables the men with the pole charges
to advance. When the flame-throwing detachment is
about to run out of fuel, a designated engineer shouts
“Last jet!” (Letzter Strahl). Each man who is carry-
ing a pole charge advances to an embrasure and
detonates his charge inside it. Prisoners state that

538861° — 43 6

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

these charges are effective even against closed
embrasures.

If the pillbox continues to hold out, either of two
alternatives is possible :

(1) The engineers may throw7 smoke candles into the
pillbox to drive out the occupants.

(2) The engineers may blow in the roof, using a
charge weighing about 110 pounds. This charge,
which may be carried in two pieces, is fitted with
handles for easy transport. It is circular, and has a
concave undersurface and convex upper surface. It is
said to be about 10 inches thick in the center, but
thinner toward the edge. Since the charge is con-
structed on the hollow-charge principle, it can pene-
trate normal concrete or armor. It is detonated by a
friction igniter.

As soon as an important pillbox has been taken, a
swastika flag is draped over it as warning to friendly
dive bombers. A pillbox in a fortress, for example, is
considered especially “important.”

3. ATTACKS ON TRENCHES

German engineers who have taken part in exercises
involving attacks on trenches state that they have used
ordinary assault methods, preceded by a liberal use of
hand grenades.

For this purpose, certain men are trained as short-
distance throwers ( Nahwerfer ) or as long-distance
throwers (Weitwerfer) . The flame-throwing detach-
ments move directly behind the hand-grenade throw-

GERMAIN Y — ENGINEER ASSAULT TACTICS 37

ers, and the whole party is covered by machine-gun fire
from the flanks.

[Note. — The Germans, having devised these tactics, are thoroughly fa-
miliar with the methods of defense against them, one of the most important
of which is the use of pressure and trip antipersonnel devices in the vicinity
of the dead angles of bunkers. Extremely meticulous intelligence is an es-
sential for this type of assault.]

Section V. MISCELLANEOUS

1. INSTRUCTIONS IN CASE OF CAPTURE

Like tlie troops of other nations, German soldiers
are instructed to reveal nothing more than “name,
rank, and serial number” in ease of capture, and are
reminded that in accordance with international law,
any other information may (and must) be refused. In
addition, the German Army warns its soldiers to obey
certain special instructions :

a. If you believe you are in danger of being captured, de-
stroy all papers that you have on your person. Above all, tear
out page 4 of your Soldbuch (pay book), which mentions
your unit.

b. If you are captured, be strictly military and, at the same
time, polite. Don’t be influenced by friendliness on the part
of the enemy, or by threats.

c. Never speak the enemy’s language.

d. Always remember that the most trivial things, to which you
attach no importance, can often give valuable information to
the enemy.

e. No interest in technical questions is to be shown, not
even when the questioner tries to provoke an argument by
belittling German weapons.

f. Don’t try to deceive by false answers.

g. Don’t let yourself be fooled by an assumed knowledge, on
the questioner’s part, of the subject under discussion.

GERMANY — MISCELLANEOUS 39

h. Don’t discuss military matters or details of operations
with your fellow prisoners.

In North Africa the German Army regarded the
following information as especially valuable to the
United Nations, and warned its troops that they must
take every precaution to keep it secret :

a. The unit to which you belong, and its location.

b. The effectives of your unit, and its losses.

c. The other units which belong to your regiment or your
division. The other units which were engaged at the same
time as yours, and their effectives.

d. When, and by what means, you arrived in the theater of
operations, what you saw on your way, and when you had
your last leave.

e. What weapons the German Army has, whether you have
seen any new ones, and if and when new or repaired tanks
may be expected to arrive.

f. The morale of German troops; details regarding supplies
and materiel.

g. The morale at home; the effect of United Nations bombing.

German soldiers in other theaters of operation re-
ceive similar warnings. The Germans caution their
troops not to believe that better treatment will be given
them if they consent to talk. It is stressed that even
after a soldier has been interrogated, he must be care-
ful when talking to other comrades in the camp, be-
cause of the possibility that a listening apparatus
may have been installed. Troops are warned, too, that
strangers in German uniforms may try to win their
confidence, and that these strangers will certainly be
spies. Speaking over the radio, making phonograph
recordings, and writing of war experiences are strictly
forbidden.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Of special significance is the German Army’s threat
of future punishment if these orders are not fully
obeyed :

Every prisoner remains a German soldier. You must re-
alize that after your return you will, if necessary, be called
upon to answer for your behavior during your time of
captivity.

2. PRISONERS* RUSE

According to a German prisoner, the following trick
may be attempted by German soldiers who are about
to be taken prisoner. Sometimes, just before a man
is captured, he empties his aluminum canteen, slits
it from base to neck, places his automatic pistol in the
hollow space, and presses the sides of the canteen to-
gether again. He also presses the sides against the
weapon to keep it from rattling. He then draws the
canvas cover over the canteen. The weight of the pistol
is approximately equal to the weight of a canteen filled
with water.

If a man who follows this procedure is not detected,
he will be able to carry his pistol into an internment
camp, where he can use the weapon against his cap-
tors, either while he is attempting to escape or in some
other situation.

3. USE OF ROVING GUNS

The following extract from a German Army docu-
ment discusses the tactical use of roving guns:

GE RMANY — M1SCE LLANE OUS

The two principal reasons for using a roving gun are :

a. To avoid betraying the location of the actual battery posi-
tions if the target can be dealt with by a few guns.

b. To camouflage the fire of our own activity by offering con-
siderable protection against enemy flash-spotting and sound
ranging

In the first case, each battery will site a gun 200 to 300 yards
to the flank of the battery position. From a gunnery point of
view, it is technically desirable to site the roving gun well on the
flank of the No. 1 gun. It is not an advantage to displace it
further by putting it forward or to the rear of the actual gun
position, because fire control thus becomes more difficult and
enemy observers can more easily identify the explosions of indi-
vidual guns. If the gun is merely put 200 to 300 yards forward
or to the rear, it may deceive as to the location of the other guns
of the battery, but it also will bring the battery position within
the 100-percent zone of fire 1 directed against the roving gun. All
ranging and harassing fire can be carried out by these guns. The
roving guns of a battalion or even larger unit may be concentrated
against important targets.

In the second case, the best camouflage will be obtained if pro-
vision is made that all firing be done as far as possible by concen-
trated fire and by as many batteries as possible. Batteries will
lay down the concentration only after fire from the roving guns
has been seen or heard. The roving guns will fire until the
batteries have concluded their concentrated fire.

1 That is, within the dispersion pattern.

Part Two: Italy

Section I. B2, S. C. G. AT MINE AND
BA ANTIPERSONNEL MINE

1. B2. S. C. G. ANTITANK MINE (see fig. 17)

a. Characteristics

The B2, S. C. G., which is the principal Italian anti-
tank mine, is a rectangular metal box, 3*4 feet by 5
inches by 5 inches, weighing 33 pounds and containing
about 7 pounds of explosive. The box has an over-all
cover attached by chains at each end. There are two in-
spection lids (with hinged flaps) in the cover. The
charge is placed in both ends of the box, and the firing
mechanism is in the middle. The striker is held clear
of the cap by a wire. When the lid is pressed down, this
wire is sheared by a knife edge on the underside of the
lid.

b. To Neutralize

(1) If Lifting by Hand Is Ordered

(a) Search for booby traps and neutralize them.

(b) Open both inspection lids gently.

ITALY B2, S. C. G. AT MINE AND B4 ANTIPERSONNEL MINE 43

(2) If Pulling Clear Without Searching for Booby
Traps Is Ordered

(a) Pull clear with 50 yards of cable.

(b) If the mine is still intact, carry out (b) and

(c), as above.

1 There Is a newer model of the B2, which has a safety-pin hole between
the cap holder and the lever. When neutralizing this model, insert the
safety pin or nail or stout wire through the hole before removing the cap
holder.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

2. B4 ANTIPERSONNEL MINE (see fig. 18)

a. Characteristics

The B4, which is the principal Italian antipersonnel
mine, is a shrapnel mine which scatters scrap metal
when detonated. Since the mine does not have the
“jack-in-the-box” effect of the British and German
types, it is generally fixed to a tree or a post.
However, there have been instances in which B4’s
have been buried in the ground. The B4 is fired
by trip wires or tension release.

b. To Neutralize

(1) Insert a nail or a stout wire into the safety-
pin hole in the striker.

(2) Pull out the cap holder.

(3) Cut the tension wire and trip wires after check-
ing the other ends for booby traps.

ITALY B2, S. C. G. AT MINE AND B4 ANTIPERSONNEL MINE 45

Figure 18. — B4 (Italian antipersonnel) Mine.

Section II. NOTES ON ATTACK

1. INTRODUCTION

The following notes on attack were written by an
Italian commander to correct what he termed some
very bad errors in elementary tactics. The notes,
addressed to “all officers,” discuss a familiar Italian
weakness — failure to organize a defensive position
after a successful advance.

2. THE NOTES

Attacking units which have little or no opposition frequently
stop after reaching their objectives, deciding that their part
of the action has been completed. Not only does this affect
discipline, but it neglects the most elementary defense and
safety precautions, as the soldiers put themselves in full view
of the enemy, and break ranks to gaze around and wander
about the area. The results that could derive from such incon-
ceivable conduct are evident and understandable. Such conduct
occurs at the most critical and difficult phase of the action —
when enemy reaction is to be expected more or less immediately,
either in the nature of artillery fire or counterattack.

The regulations for such cases are clear and explicit, and
therefore I do not deem it necessary to quote their contents
since they constitute the basis of technical professional training.

NOTES ON ATTACK 47

However, I wish to make quite clear certain tactical necessities
which should be kept in mind and practiced.

a. During Attack

(1) Cover your exposed flank with the machine-gun platoon.

(2) Keep flanking units within sight, and coordinate your fire
with theirs.

(3) See that units don’t get mixed up.

(4) Overcome the tendency to close up.

b. When Objective Has Been Gained

(1) Proceed immediately and speedily beyond the objective, and
organize a defensive position (use your engineers).

(2) Maintain the greatest cohesion within units, keeping under
cover and out of sight of the enemy.

(3) Get your weapons into firing position.

(4) Re-form the reserves.

(5) Watch the flanks.

c. During Rest Periods

(1) Keep the unit under control.

(2) Dispose units in the positions best suited for observation
and fire.

The above notes reveal clearly the importance of the infantry
squad in fighting, and therefore their application is the specific
job of noncommissioned officers. Company and platoon command-
ers will insist on the proper execution of these measures.

Part Three: Japan1

Section I. AMERICAN WOUNDED TELL
ABOUT JAPANESE ON ATTU

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent individual interviews, U. S. soldiers
wounded on Attu described the lessons they learned in
combat with the Japanese. The statements made by
these wounded men are reproduced here with only a few
changes to eliminate repetition. In compliance with a
policy of the Military Intelligence Service, the names of
the men interviewed are omitted.

2. THE INTERVIEWS

Private (rifleman) — The Japanese are sneaky and treacherous.
They shot and injured one of our men, who then started making
his way toward our lines. The Japanese withheld their fire until
our man was within 100 yards of our troops; then the Japs
shot him enough to break him down so he couldn’t go any further.
They figured that we would send several men out after him, and
that they could kill all of them. After waiting some time for us
to try a rescue, the Japs killed the wounded man.

1 In Intelligence Bulletin No. 11, page 75, the title of paragraph 4 should
read “Defense Against Aircraft.”

JAPAN ABOUT JAPANESE ON ATTU

Maybe other soldiers going into combat zones conld profit by
the lessons I learned the hard way. Never stand up while digging
a foxhole. Lie on one side and dig awhile, then on the other. If
you are lying down when a mortar shell strikes near you, it
won’t hurt so much — and you won’t make a good target for a Jap
rifleman or machine gunner. I was one of those who stood up
to dig foxholes — and now I’m in the hospital suffering from a
concussion. Had I listened to what was taught me in training,
I might still be out there helping to get rid of those Japs. I was
a good marksman but not a good soldier — because a good soldier
takes every advantage offered. I’ve learned my lesson now.

Sergeant (rifle platoon) — Apparently the Japs are easily con-
fused. Even when we pretended to throw a hand grenade, they
would scatter in all directions — thus becoming easy targets for
our riflemen. They were not equal to our soldiers in hand-to-
hand combat.

One thing that impressed me was the accuracy the Japanese at-
tained with their grenade discharger . . . They could place
a shell on a machine gun in two rounds — our machine gunners
will live longer if they change positions frequently.

Private First Class (machine gunner) — The Japs used the
fog in a smart manner. When the fog lifted in the morning,
they fired one long and one short mortar burst on our platoon
area to get the range. We did not move our positions, so
in the afternoon the Japs opened right in the middle of us
with their mortars. The shells buried themselves in the soft
ground before exploding, and were not as harmful as they
would have been otherwise.

My most lasting impression was of the calm and efficient
■ manner in which our medical men, unarmed, went into the
battle zones to bring out the wounded.

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1st Sergeant — The Japs like to fight in small groups, and will
try to halt a group many times their strength. They move
fast, so you have to be ready at all times to engage them.

I don’t believe the Japs are good marksmen. Many times
when they picked us for targets we got out of their field of fire
by hitting the ground and rolling 3 or 4 yards to the right or
left (they would continue for a few rounds, firing in a path).

Our equipment and weapons are better than those of the
Japs, and careful planning and use of good, clear minds will
always beat them. The Japs’ mortar is their best weapon,
although the firing methods used with it were not good.

I found that many of our men fired when they were not
sure of their target. This sometimes resulted in the drawing
of mortar and machine-gun fire and in loss of position.

Private First Class (rifleman) — My impression is that the
Japs are very poor shots with a rifle or machine gun. Watch
out for their grenade discharger, though. They really use it
a lot against personnel. If our men keep plenty of interval,
there won’t be much danger. Failure in this respect was one
of our faults. Our unit didn’t have enough room for the
number of men we had on line when we tried to assault
a hill, and we lost too many men to finish our mission.

Private First Class (rifleman) — The Japs work in pairs, and
change positions quite often. They’d even use our artillery shell
holes to machine-gun us.

To me, the Japs are fast, tricky, and treacherous. They
used camouflage expertly, and were darn hard to see. Their
uniforms looked like burlap and were a yellowish green.

Sergeant (squad leader) — Our advance was uninterrupted
except for some dummy installations, which were nothing
more than the top layer of earth turned over to confuse our
aerial photos . . .

JAPAN — ABOUT JAPANESE ON ATTU 51

The night we arrived at Temnac Bay we soon found that
the Japs were not very well disciplined about lights or smoking
at night. With the help they gave us from their lights, we
didn’t have to wait until daylight to start our mission. The
few Japs who weren’t killed that night in tents by hand gre-
nades were finished off the next morning.

Private (rifleman) — A marine once said that you could de-
tect Japs at close range by a peculiar odor [see Intelligence
Bulletin No. 5, page 37]. This is hard to explain, but we
also detected the odor on Attu when the wind blew from their
direction.

The Jap is hard to see, but once you get him in the open
he’s licked. He surely doesn’t like hand-to-hand combat.

Special efforts are made by the Japs to pick off our men
who wear insignia, or those who give hand signals.

The Japanese guns and helmets are not as good as ours.

Private (rifleman) — The greatest mistake we made was tak-
ing to the valley. The enemy was fortified on the sides of the
hills where they could fire right down on us. The important
thing is to stay separated, and to lie as low as possible. Make
your rushes fast and short, and never lie where you fall.
Always roll over two or more times, and always have the next
landing place picked out before you get up.

Private First Class (observer) — The Japs didn’t seem to aim
their machine guns; they just moved them slowly from one side
of our lines to the other — sometimes they fired into the fog
when they couldn’t even see our positions.

In my opinion, the Ml is the best rifle the individual soldier
can have; also, our hand grenades are much more effective than
the Japs’.

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Corporal (rifleman) — In my brief encounter with the Japa-
nese, I found that their rifle squads appeared to be very care-
less in maneuvering (they made a lot of noise, and had a tend-
ency to bunch together). Their riflemen were poor shots and
showed poor judgment.

Private (rifleman) — A machine gun got me. The Jap snipers
are not so hot.

Our medics were swell. They did a job that is hard to
describe, and they worked as long as 27 hours at a stretch.

Private First Class (machine gunner) — I was under fire four
days. First of all, I had to dig a slit trench to keep the enemy
from seeing and shooting at me. Cover was not hard to find.

My impression is that the Japanese soldier doesn’t have the
guts the American men have. He gives up very easily in hand-
to-hand fighting.

One thing to be careful of is hidden explosives.

Private (rifleman) — Most of our casualties resulted from
failure to take cover while advancing. The Japs are good
snipers, and are always around where you least expect them.
Watch out for dummies in trenches. They fooled us a couple
of times.

Instrument Corporal — The Japs did an excellent job of forti-
fying and camouflaging their trenches, foxholes, and other em-
placements, and their sniping was quite accurate.

Private First Class (BAR man) — I learned that the Japanese
like to do all their close fighting at night, and keep out of sight
during the day. In my opinion, they are not very brave fighters.

JAPAN' — ABOUT JAPANESE ON ATTU

Private First Class (messenger) — There is one thing I want
to stress. Every soldier should take good care of his entrench-
ing tool, because it saved many men’s lives on Attu.

Colonel (Medical Corps) — The condition of the wounds upon
arrival at this station .... was indicative of very excellent
first-aid care. There were very few infections, even though
many wounds were still open. The use of sulfanilamide or sul-
fathiaozle powders or crystals on open wounds was evidently
largely responsible for the lack of infection. We feel that no
prolonged attempt should be made to remove bullets, shell frag-
ments, or other foreign bodies in the immediate combat zone.
Sterile dressing should be applied and the patient evacuated to a
more stable area.

Section II. NOTES ON HOW JAPANESE
ATTACK PILLBOXES

1. INTRODUCTION

The information in this section is based, on a transla-
tion of six handwritten loose sheets of notes, which
probably belonged, to a Japanese officer who was killed
or wounded in the Buna area of New Guinea. The
notes apparently do not give the complete Japanese
doctrine on attacking pillboxes, although some phases
are described in detail.

The use of poison gas as one means of reducing pill-
boxes is casually mentioned in one place in the notes.
This indicates that at least some Japanese troops may
be trained in certain uses of poison gas ; however, there
are no confirmed reports to date that they have used it
against American, British, or Australian troops.
Numerous reports from China indicate that the enemy
has used poison gas on some occasions in the Chinese
theater of operations. It is probable that the notes
presented below were based, at least in part, on
Japanese experience in the use of gas in China.

To bear the major burden of attack against pill-
boxes, the Japanese — according to the notes — organize

JAPAN HOW JAPANESE ATTACK PILLBOXES

a “Pillbox-attack Butai,” with regular front-line units
usually assisting the Butai. [The word butai is loosely
used to denote any group of soldiers.]

2. ORGANIZATION, AND ATTACK DUTIES

The organization and duties of various units or detachments
which constitute the Pillbox-attack Butai are listed below. (It
is essential that all concerned cooperate very closely).

a. Assault Han1 — Its principal object it temporary neutraliza-
tion of the pillbox. It will be composed of a machine-gun or
an engineer detachment, and, if needed, a reserve hart. In order
to take advantage of the terrain and to insure speedy movement,
this han should have a bare minimum of personnel (less than
six men, if possible).

b. Assisting Fire-power Detachment — This is composed prin-
cipally of a light machine-gun squad and a heavy machine-gun
squad.

c. Mopping- up II an — Its objective is to mop up the enemy
completely.

d. Obstacle-demolition Han — This can be a machine-gun de-
tachment, or — depending on the situation — an engineer detach-
ment, or both. (This han is necessary if the Mopping-up Han
needs demolition work done before it can complete its mission.

e. River-crossing Construction Han — This will be a machine-
gun or engineer detachment.

3. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Make the equipment light — carry only a minimum of weapons
and instruments. Machine-gun and engineer units engaged in
construction will not carry rifles.

1 This unit normally is roughly equivalent to our squad ; however, in prac-
tice its strength has a wide variation. It usually corresponds to what we
would term a “detachment.”

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Carry as many hand grenades, gas grenades, or other close-
combat weapons as possible.

Be equipped for silent movements.

Wear bullet-proof jackets if necessary.

If you attack at night, select passwords and erect appropriate
markers. Carry flashlights, ropes, and the signaling equipment
necessary for liaison with our own troops.

The weapons and equipment to be carried by each individual
unit or detachment of the Pillbox-assault Butai are listed
below.

a. Assault Han:

(1) Rifle, bayonet, and shovel;

(2) Hand grenades, gas hand grenades, and smoke candles;

(3) Flame thrower or gas spray; kerosene or fuel oil;

(4) Instrument for blocking loopholes ( a loophole-shaped piece
of metal attached to a rod which is about 3 yards long), or a
loophole-blocking sandbag ;

(5) Signaling equipment;

(6) Equipment for demolishing wire entanglements;

(7) Materials to aid in the crossing of rivers ; and

(8) Bullet-proof jackets or shields.

b. Assisting Fire-power Detachment:

Smoke bombs or gas bombs, which may be fired from accom-
panying guns.

c. Mopping-up Han

In addition to carrying the same type of weapons as the As-
sault Han, the Mopping-up Han should have, if deemed neces-
sary, a bangalore torpedo, a hand-sprinkling poison gas can,
and a sandbag.

[No mention is made here of specific items of equipment for the Obstacle-
demolition Ban or for the River-crossing Construction Han.]

JAPAN — HOW JAPANESE ATTACK PILLBOXES

4. METHODS OF ATTACK

a. Assisting Fire-power Detachment

From the line of general approach, advance as close as pos-
sible to the front of the pillbox — to a point from which it is
most convenient to fire into the loophole. Get close enough to
see the opening and closing of the loophole with the naked eye.
and wait for a suitable time to start firing. (The best time
for approaching is at night.)

The required standard strength for observing and neutraliz-
ing the loophole is a follows:

When armed with rifles 1 squad.

When armed with LMG 1 LMG (1 in reserve if

necessary).

When armed with Hv MG 1 Hv MG.

When armed with rapid-firing 1 gun.
gun or Mt gun.

b. Assault Han

This unit must cooperate closely with the Assisting Fire-power
Detachment, and, with the aid of its fire, close in on the pillbox
during a lull in hostile fire.

One method of approach is to divide the han into small groups
and close in on the pillbox from several directions.

In any approach, consider the effects of enemy flanking fire,
and utilize the terrain as skillfully as possible. Careful use of
creeping tactics, when enemy fire was heavy, has recently proved
to be better than individual rushing, or the direct-advance
method.

We usually suffer considerably more casualties while at a halt
than we do while advancing. However, we must not return
fire received when we first halt, unless the situation is favor-
able. Usually we should skillfully change our positions imme-
diately after halting, getting the best cover available. Then it is
permissible to commence firing.

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c. Mopping-up Han

Wait for your opportunity near the Assisting Fire-power De-
tachment, and advance immediately after the Assault Sari's
charge and mop up the enemy. Cooperate closely with the As-
sault Han in order to make good use of its gains.

d. Machine-Gun or Engineer Detachment

This detachment, in charging and mopping up, will occupy
those places which are concealed from enemy flanking fire, such
as loophole dead spaces. Sometimes suitable places can be dis-
covered in communication trenches or other excavations* at the
rear entrance to the pillbox. It is comparatively safe to lie on
top of a flat pillbox, but not on one which has a sloping roof.

Loopholes usually are closed by use of loophole-closing equip-
ment or sandbags. ’When such items are not carried, use a
shovel — climb on top of the pillbox and place the shovel over
the loophole.

Hand grenades or gas hand grenades are very useful to
attack the defenders near the pillbox openings. Recent experi-
ence shows that the simplest method of attack is to throw hand
grenades into the ventilation hole — however, first determine
whether the ventilation hole is covered by any kind of netting.

If tactically desirable, you can prevent the closing of the
loophole by throwing hand grenades at the loophole door.

In attempting to penetrate the pillbox by way of the rear
door, you must take the initiative and not give the enemy time
to fire. Also, watch out for pistol fire. If you fail to penetrate
the rear door — after having used hand grenades and other
equipment — block it with sandbags to prevent escape of the
enemy.

Flame throwers, or rag bundles soaked with gasoline, kerosene,
and so forth, are quite effective weapons, once you get close
enough to use them.

[At this point the Japanese notes mention “methods of releasing per-
sistent or nonpersistent gas before attacking guards.” However, no details
are given.]

JAPAN — HOW JAPANESE ATTACK PILLBOXES

When using explosives, not less than 20,000 grains of powder
are necessary to make a gap in pillboxes, the sides of which are
a yard or more thick — we have encountered countless numbers
of such pillboxes in this campaign [probably in China]. There-
fore, the explosive method is used mostly for bursting doors or
widening loopholes to aid in the mopping-up activities.

e. Night Attacks

If the attack is made at night, each unit or detachment of the
Pillbox-attack Butai should penetrate the pillbox area as silently
as possible. The commanding officer will indicate a position
from which a surprise attack will be made.

The terrain, enemy situation, and particularly the degree of
darkness will determine the exact method of attack.

Close liaison must be maintained at all times, and care must
be taken to prevent friendly troops from firing at each other
by mistake.

f. Assistance by Other Troops

In addition to the Pillbox-attack Butai , the front-line troop
units, during their advance, will also carry out attacks on
pillboxes.

Their object is not necessarily the direct capture of pillboxes.
These units will infiltrate the pillbox area in order to capture
the entire depth of the enemy’s front-line positions.

When advancing at full length, it is necessary to use leap-frog
methods. For example, the No. 2 line unit will leap-frog the
No. 1 unit.

Throughout the day, these units must maintain close liaison
with the fire-power unit in the neutralization of enemy fire.
Also, the Mopping-up unit must stay in the immediate rear of
the No. 1 unit at all times, in order to protect the advancing
front line from harassing rear attacks.

60 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5. DESTRUCTION BY BOMBARDMENT

Even if the decision is to destroy pillboxes by bombardment,
it is still necessary to organize a Pillbox-occupation Detachment.
However, in actual combat, the bombardment method is seldom
used.

Experience has shown that in order to destroy a pillbox 90
centimeters (approximately 3 ft.) or more thick, it is necessary
to use 150-mm artillery.

Section III. DEFENSE TECHNIQUES

1. POSITIONS

If possible, the Japanese choose defensive positions
which are flanked on one or both sides by natural
obstacles, such as the sea, rivers, creeks, steep hills,
and mountains. In Burma the positions invariably
included tank obstacles, which usually were natural
barriers.. If natural obstacles did not exist, the
Japanese generally utilized the terrain most easily
converted into obstacles.

In hilly country, the Japanese — like the Germans —
prepare their main defensive positions on the reverse
slopes. They tunnel into the hillsides, and build
dugouts which afford adequate protection against field
guns, except for direct hits. Well-constructed earth-
works protect the Japanese from normal infantry
supporting weapons.

On a steep hill in New Guinea, the Japanese
arranged defensive positions wThich consisted largely
of one-man pits and platforms, cut into the sides
of the hill. The pits usually were about 4 feet deep,
about 18 inches in diameter, and situated an average
of approximately 20 feet apart. The platforms were

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

approximately 14 feet by 6 feet, and appeared to be
sited to conform with the general defense layout.
Ammunition strips and cartridge cases were found bn
these platforms, which also were used for sleeping
purposes.

All the pits were linked together with trails, which
were not visible from the air because the defense area
was under heavily branched trees. A fence, 4 feet
high and made of small logs, extended across the area.
An alarm wire, about ankle high, was strung beyond
the fence. Tin cans were tied to the wire at about
5-foot intervals.

2. WEAPONS

In Burma the Japanese followed the normal prac-
tice of using machine guns as the principal weapon
of defense. Medium machine guns were sited well
forward. They generally were sub-allotted to platoon
areas, and were often found on high terrain or dug
into the sides of steep terrain. These weapons often
were sited singly, and always were provided with alter-
nate positions.

It is important to remember that Japanese medium
machine guns, on the defensive, sometimes fire along
a line about 10 yards from the forward edge of the
J apanese main line of resistance. And assaulting sol-
diers— if unprotected by smoke or darkness — may suf-
fer heavy casualties immediately in front of the enemy
position, particularly if they become bunched in con-
verging on the objective.

JAPAN — DEFENSE TECHNIQUES

Next to machine guns, mortars and grenade dis-
chargers are of great importance to the Japanese on
defense. Mortars 3 inches or more in caliber may be
allotted to rifle companies on a scale of one per com-
pany, but the 50-mm grenade discharger is more
frequently used by the forward units — each platoon
being equipped with three or four of these dischargers.

3. TACTICS IN COMBAT

The Japanese, cleverly concealed, hold their fire dur-
ing an attack until the opposing forces are close — too
close for the latter to receive support from artillery,
mortars, and medium machine guns. Then the Japs
cut loose with a heavy volume of machine-gun fire.
They also throw showers of grenades, particularly if
the attackers are advancing uphill.

In Burma the Japanese launched immediate coun-
terattacks against soldiers who had captured a part
of an area. These attacks were on a small scale, a
dozen men led by an officer. They were preceded by
a shower of grenade-discharger shells. A wild cry, to
which the shout “Charge!”, in English, was sometimes
added, gave warning of the counterattack.

On numerous occasions during the fighting on Attu,
the Japanese would withdraw — or be forced — from
ridge lines, drop down the reverse slope to positions
just below the military crest, and wait for U. S. sol-
diers to come over the top. Then the enemy opened
up with machine guns, rifles, and grenade dischargers.
Therefore, to capture a ridge, it was necessary for our

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soldiers to take the reverse slope to a point just be-
yond the military crest as well as the ridge itself.
Many of the Japanese counterattacks were launched
on reverse slopes so steep that the enemy had to crawl
on all fours to advance. Moreover, in doing this, the
Japs were excellent targets for our forces armed with
Ml rifles and hand grenades.

Section IV. NOTES ON JAPANESE
SECURITY MEASURES1

1. INTRODUCTION

Some of the security measures observed by the Japa-
nese are given below in the form of extracts taken from
Japanese documents. Although the facts contained in
these extracts have not been changed, they have been
reorganized and edited for the sake of clarity.

These extracts are presented with the view that such
information will stimulate the security efforts made by
our own troops, in addition to familiarizing them with
Japanese security methods. It must be kept in mind
throughout that these extracts are statements of Japa-
nese doctrine and must not be confused with our own.

2. GENERAL SUPERVISION

The Japanese state that the observance of proper
security measures and the maintenance of good military
discipline are very closely related. Almost invariably,
troops who halfheartedly observe security regulations
are poorly disciplined troops.

1 See FM 30-5 for a discussion of IT. S. security methods.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

The following quotation gives an indication of Japa-
nese thought about security duties :

“In case secret information leaks out, soldiers should
be trained to take the same action against their soldier
and civilian friends that they would take against
soldiers and civilians who are strangers.”

Although the Japanese have security regulations to
cover all units and situations, the documents quoted in
this section deal mainly with the battalion. Each bat-
talion has a security committee which consists of a
president (senior Hq company officer), the battalion
adjutant, and one officer from each unit.

The duties of the committee, as outlined by the Japa-
nese, are as follows :

The president controls and supervises the security training, and
decides what action, if any, will be taken against offenders. He
is assisted by the committee in gathering materials for security
instruction and in fostering a state of security -mindedness among
all personnel. The president, the committee, and the commanding
officer of each unit utilizes the time of internal inspections to con-
duct special security investigations. The committee holds meet-
ings from time to time to study security matters and to determine
the most efficient methods of putting security measures into
operation.

All unit commanders and committee members, noncoms and
above, are particularly expected to give detailed instructions con-
cerning means of carrying our security measures.

The battalion security committee will see that timely security
bulletins are published from time to time to prevent troops falling
into a condition we might call security “stagnancy.”

JAPAN — JAPANESE SECURITY MEASURES

3. PRECAUTIONS

a. In Handling Classified Matter

(1) Distribute only a list of documents to units within the
battalion — the documents not directly necessary for an individual
unit will be held by battalion headquarters and examined only
when necessary.

(2) Collect all documents of no further value, and have them
burned under supervision of the depot unit’s noncom orderly of
the week (day).

(3) Tightly seal secret military documents for dispatching, and
get a receipt for same to insure against loss.

(4) Do not mix things classified as secret with material of a
lower classification ; do not put them in map cases or similar con-
tainers which could be dropped and lost. Even if things are not
classified secret, do not leave them lying around.

(5) Treat as extremely secret all documents concerning instruc-
tional organizations, plans for maneuvers, and lists of personnel.

(6) Make only the number of copies absolutely necessary [in
preparing secret documents],

(7) Make certain that the person so designated disposes of
classified documents after their use.

(8) Prohibit persons outside the unit from seeing, or even be-
ing aware of, the presence of classified documents.

(9) Be cautious in selecting the custodian of secret documents.

(10) Be sure that the security box for secret documents is
strong and has a lock. It must be kept under supervision at all
times.

(11) Guard the receptacle in which secret things are carried
and the method of transportation, and see that the receptacle is
not opened, dropped, or lost.

b. Regarding Military Personnel

(1) Don’t talk carelessly about military matters outside the
barracks, even when among soldiers.

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(2) Forbid subordinates t o take notes of secret military matters
during instruction periods.

(3) Don’t mention secret military matters in talking over the
telephone; communicate in writing, or make contact personally.
If the person at the other end of the line mentions secret matters,
caution him immediately.

(4) Make it impossible for anyone to determine, by marks of
destination, the proper name of a unit, the number of personnel,
and so forth.

(5) Appoint a person in charge of security in every room
[barracks].

(6) Enforce the display of security slogans, epigrams, and the
like in soldiers’ rooms, canteens, passages, public places, and so
forth.

(7) Pay particular attention to security in the official bachelor
quarters outside the barracks.

(8) Forbid typists in each headquarters department to read
or compare each other’s notes.

(9) Strictly control rumors and baseless lies. Dispel idle talk
and uneasy curiosity by promptly informing every individual
about matters they are entitled to know.

c. Regarding Inspections and Censorship

(1) Watch for letters, parcels, and articles brought into bar-
racks, and enforce their strictest inspection.

(2) Be strictly secret in censoring personal communications.

(3) Assign a censor for personal communications at head-
quarters of battalions and companies. Unless such communica-
tions bear the franking seal of said officers, the former will not
be accepted at the post office.

(4) See that personal correspondence of persons living in bar-
racks is written on post cards. Sealed letters may be used only
with the permission of unit commanders.

(5) Forbid persons living in barracks to post mail outside the
barracks (this also applies during field maneuvers, and so forth).

(6) Never use the proper name of your unit except as author-

JAPAN JAPANESE SECURITY MEASURES 69

ized by regulations. The common designation will be used on all
ordinary documents.

d. In Dealing with Civilians

(1) Increase security vigilance when you come in contact with
persons outside your unit (when bivouacking in the country, and
so forth).

(2) Be sure that outsiders do not observe our organization,
equipment, or the techniques of combat during drills, maneuvers,
marching,. and inspection. Post guards to prevent the approach
of outsiders.

(3) Keep employed laborers or coolies from observing our
military strength or tactics.

(4) Strictly inspect articles brought in or taken away by visi-
tors— except in the case of visiting commissioned officers.

(5) Warn clerks and other civilians of the importance of vigi-
lant security precautions. In particular, supervise and guide
printing personnel, typists, and telephone exchange operators.

(6) See that printers retain no proofs.

(7) Pass the prints of commemorative photographs through
the hands of the responsible person, and see that the negatives are
collected.

(8) Take precautions with civilians connected with canteens,
cooking, construction, newspaper delivery, and photography.

(9) Greatly restrict the movement of civilians through bar-
racks, and the coming and going of groups of persons.

(10) Investigate the personal history of merchants having
dealings at barracks or camps, and make frequent secret investi-
gations into their means of livelihood. In liaison with the mili-
tary and provincial police, increase these considerations tenfold
where Koreans are concerned. Carefully supervise the coming
and going of merchants.

(11) Have business conversations conducted only by those in
charge of such matters. Be cautious with documents relating to
business transactions — because information about organization,

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

equipment, and number of personnel can be deduced from the
amount and number of transactions.

(12) Determine the best time and place to make purchases, from
the standpoint of security.

(13) Supervise newspapermen as follows: Have a definite
entrance and exit; see that they do not talk with persons other
than those in charge; and see that no photographs are taken
without permission.

e. Regarding Foreigners

(1) See that military personnel have none except official con-
tacts with foreigners. Take particular precautions with English-
men, Americans, Russians, and “Anti-Hitlerites” — of whom there
are a large number despite the fact that they are German — in
order to prevent discovery of our intentions.

(2) Report with all speed any foreigners or suspicious persons
discovered wandering around in the vicinity of barracks or
bivouac areas.

(3) Exercise, thorough precautions and supervision in respect
to Christianity. Control the relationships of Korean Christians
with Englishmen and Americans.

4. EXAMPLES OF VIOLATIONS

In order to illustrate some of the common violations
of security regulations, the Japanese have published a
long list of military personnel who have broken security
rules. The list gives the full name and the unit of the
offenders in each instance, the nature of the violation,
the scope of leakage, and the measures taken by security
authorities.

A few examples of the violations are given below to
illustrate some of the ways a soldier can imperil his

JAPAN JAPANESE SECURITY MEASURES

country and endanger the lives of his comrades hy being-
careless, indifferent, or criminal with regard to
security.

a. Sergeant — wrote in a letter w. . . . at this time, to tell the
truth, we are secretly preparing for war.”

b. Sergeant — wrote a military transportation schedule on the
wall of a railroad station, where he was assigned to duty
in a line-of-communication unit, and frequently left his post
unguarded.

c. Private — “It seems that pretty soon I shall be setting out for
X. Our regiment is making steady .preparations .... We
have been issued battle kits, and so forth.”

d. Officer — wore a combat uniform and carried a military sword
(wrapped in white cloth), thus disclosing at a glance that he was
leaving for the front. While attending a banquet, he said :
.... This is our last drink with you.”

e. Officer — “Now is the day for field units and replacement
units to prepare for action. It is difficult to measure in the hearts
of the people whether it shall be peace or war. This depends on
the international situation. I feel sad when I think of our lack
of materials for weapons .... I shall go to Kantosho, Man-
chukuo . . . .”

g. Military laborer — “The European crisis has been brought
closer. Feeling on the Soviet-Manehurian frontier [some time
before Dec. 7, 1941] has also suddenly become worse, and the
reservists .... are being posted one by one to military
stations . . . .”

Part Four: United Nations

Section I. HOW BRITISH DEAL WITH

ROAD CRATERS, OBSTACLES

1. INTRODUCTION

In the British Army, troops of all arms are in-
structed. how to deal with road craters and road
obstacles when prompt action is required in an
emergency. The following is an extract from a Brit-
ish Army document on this subject:

2. CRATERS

First, look for antitank mines, antipersonnel mines, and booby
traps, within or around the craters. Then look for a detour
and use it if possible, cutting down fences and ramping all low
banks. If a suitable detour exists, it will nearly always be more
advisable to use it than to repair the crater.

If it is necessary to fill in the craters, slightly different meth-
ods will be used for dry and wet craters.

a. Dry Craters

Trample down all loose earth inside the crater.

Start filling the crater with all the loose soil available. As
soon as the depth has been sufficiently reduced, a tracked vehicle
72

UNITED NATIONS ROAD CRATERS, OBSTACLES

should be. driven across the crater to consolidate the soil, and
this procedure repeated at intervals. Where brushwood is avail-
able, alternate layers of brushwood and soil should be laid. The
brushwood will help to consolidate the soil, and at the same
time distribute the load. Any rock, stone, or gravel thrown up
by the explosion should be saved, and used later in making the
road surface..

Continue filling until the depth of the crater has been reduced
to 3 feet. As a rule, any filled-in craters of this depth will be
passable for tracked vehicles, %-ton trucks, and even l^-ton
trucks.

If it is essential to make a passage for all military vehicles,
cut ramps on opposite sides of the crater, and shovel the soil
from these two cuts into the crater. If each ramp is cut 10 feet
long, enough soil will be made available to reduce the depth of
the average crater so that it will be passable for all vehicles.

The surfacing of a filled-in crater should be completed before
any but the most essential vehicles are permitted to cross, unless
the crater is completely dry and likely to remain so. Otherwise,
vehicles crossing over will churn up the soil and soon render
further crossing impossible. The surfacing should consist of the
stones and gravel which have been reserved for this purpose or
of fascines [brushwood bundles]. A maintenance party will be
needed to look after the surface until an engineer repair party
can take over.

The following table may be used as a guide to indicate the
time and labor required for crater filling. If a party of 20
men, equipped with picks, shovels, and axes, go to work on a dry

crater 25 feet in diameter and 7 feet deep, in medium soil, they
can ;nake it passable for

tracked vehicles in 30 minutes

“4 x 4” (all-wheel-drive) trucks in 35 minutes

^4 -ton trucks in 40 minutes

all vehicles except buses in 75 minutes

all vehicles in three hours

74 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN'

b. Wet Craters

If a crater contains water, a modification of the above proce-
dure will be necessary.

If rocks and stones are available, use them to fill the crater up
to water level. If there are no rocks or stones at hand, fill the
crater bottom with earth. Cover this with two layers of empty
sandbags to form a seal. Lay 9 inches of brushwood, and then
9 inches of earth. Repeat this sequence of empty sandbags,
brushwood, and earth until the depth of the crater has been re-
duced to 3 feet. Layers should be laid so that they slope up-
ward toward the center of the road to allow for consolidation of
the center.

After this, follow the procedure outlined for filling a dry
crater.

Water-filled craters naturally take slightly longer to improve
than dry craters.

3. OTHER ROAD OBSTACLES

Hastily contrived road obstacles — such as farm wagons, the
wheels of which have been removed, or felled trees — will often
be fairly easy to destroy or move. However, it should be taken
for granted that they will be liberally bobby-trapped. There
will seldom be enough time to wait for skilled engineer personnel
to locate and neutralize these traps. Therefore, the first troops
to arrive on the site will find it necessary to set off the traps by
using hand grenades or by tying ropes to the obstacle and,
from a safe distance, hauling it off the road. It must also be
remembered that antitank mines will probably have been laid
in the road underneath the obstacle ; for this reason, an extremely
careful examination of the road surface is a necessity.

Finally, it is strongly emphasized that if any possible detour
exists, it is normally much quicker to go around an obstacle than
to remove it. It must be expected that detours or obvious turn-
outs will be imaginatively mined and booby-trapped.

Section II. BRITISH JUNIOR OFFICER

TELLS COMBAT EXPERIENCES

1. INTRODUCTION

The following letter from a British platoon com-
mander in North Africa to one of his friends in an
officers school in England discusses German and Brit-
ish tactics, and makes a number of valuable sugges-
tions. It is reprinted here for the information of
American junior officers who may face similar combat
problems.

2. "TIPS FROM THE FRONT"

Dear Tom :

You asked in your letter for a few “tips from the front.” Here
they are.

In attack, get your platoon 'going on location of fire, observa-
tion, and intelligent use of all available information. Our initial
tendency (and it wasn’t altogether the platoon commander’s
fault) was to rush into the attack without a really thorough
reconnaissance, and without going over with the noncoms every
bit of information we had about the enemy’s positions. Once
you’re in it, it’s hell’s own game trying to see where the bullets
are coming from, unless you have a fair idea where the swine
ought to be. Even then, it’s not so easy.

We have lost a lot of officers through platoon commanders
being too eager and moving right up with their leading squad.

INTELLIGENCE bulletin

You can fight your platoon a darned sight, better by staying in
a position from which you can maneuver your reserve (that is,
your two rear squads) when you have seen what fire is drawn by
the leading squad. The same applies to company commanders,
of course. Practice lots of frontal attacks. Boche positions are
so invariably mutually supporting that platoon flanking attacks
are damned hard, especially as the bloke you are after is prob-
ably supported by medium machine-gun fire from somewhere out
of range of your light machine gun.

Approach marches are important. You nearly always have
several miles to cover, probably in the dark, before you reach
the place from which the attack starts. The condition in which
your men reach that assembly area is going to make a whole lot
of difference in their performance when the big moment comes.
If the march has been a scramble, and if they are rushed into
the attack as soon as they arrive, morale will be low. If the
march has been orderly, with plenty of time to check up on
everything and rest the men at the assembly area, they will
start off confident and be much more likely to do a good job.

Defense took rather a back seat at home — we were supposed
to be “assault troops” — but, assault troops or not, most of your
time will be spent in defense, because whenever you are not
actually attacking, you have to be in a position to defend your-
self. So it is well worth studying. However huge an area of
country you are given, in placing your troops imagine that you
have only three-quarters of your platoons. Put your spare quar-
ter aside as a mobile reserve; then forget all the books and put
the rest wherever your own common sense and your knowledge
of Boche habits tells you. Whenever possible, you want to be
on reverse slopes — any movement on forward slopes brings the
shells down, and it is not easy to stay still all day. If the
ground forces you to take up forward slope positions, keep the
absolute minimum at battle posts to observe, and the rest in
cover until you are attacked. It is then that your fire control
comes in. The first time, unless you have been warning your
men daily, everyone will blaze off at any range at the first Boche

UNITED NATION'S — BRITISH COMBAT EXPERIENCES 77

to appear, giving all your positions away. It is much more
satisfying to let the Jerries come up a bit, and then catch them
wholesale on some open stretch. If by chance they knock out
one of your posts and start getting in among you, you can
thank God for the quarter you kept in reserve and start your
counterattack straight away. If you have got a counterattack
properly rehearsed with supporting fire, and so on, for each of
your posts, you should be able to get it in almost as soon as they
arrive, or, better still, get them in a flank as they advance.

In defense by night, the squad sentry should man the Bren
in the same trench with the squad leader. The squad leader has
his Tommy gun, a couple of grenades, and a Very pistol with
plenty of cartridges, and is ready for anything. If a Boche
patrol attacks, they will let off lashings of automatic fire at
random, to draw yours, and when they retire, it will be under
cover of mortars. The answer is, stay still and hold your fire
until you can pick a certain target. At Djebel Abiod we were
attacked by a patrol some fifteen strong. They fired literally
thousands of rounds without causing a casualty. We fired about
twenty rounds, and killed an officer and two enlisted men.
I don’t think it’s worth chasing a retiring patrol — they want you
to leave your trenches, so as to catch you with their mortars.
Instead, you can sometimes guess their line, of retreat and chase
them with your own mortar fire.

The best patrolling troops we have come across are the
Moroccan Goums, whose success as compared with any European
unit is phenomenal. Even against the best of the Germans, they
never fail. Why are they better than we are? First, because
they are wild hillmen and have been trained as warriors from
birth. Second, because the preparation of their patrols is done
with such detailed thoroughness. No fighting patrol is sent out
until its leaders have spent at least a day watching the actual
post they are after, and reconnoitering exact routes and so forth.
If the leaders are not satisfied at the end of the day, they will
postpone sending out the patrol, and will devote another day to
the preliminaries. Some of our men are a little too inclined to

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

think of a patrol at four or five in the afternoon, and send it
out that same night. To be worth a damn, a fighting patrol
must start off with an odds-on chance of two-to-one — not six-to-
four or even money, but a good two-to-one bet. To make this
possible, your information has got to be really good and up to
date. As regards composition of fighting patrols, there is a
wide divergence of opinion. In this battalion we go on the
principle of maximum fire power with minimum manpower, and
our patrols have usually consisted of an officer, a noncom, and
nine men — in other words, an assault group consisting of an
officer, three grenadiers, and three Tommy gunners, and a sup-
port group of a noncom and three Bren gunners. The type of
reconnaissance patrol which has produced the best result is the
one composed of an officer or sergeant and two men who go out
at night, remain awake and observe all the next day, and return
during the second night.

Slit trenches deserve a paragraph all to themselves. A few
days after we landed, we spent literally a whole day at Tabarka
being dive-bombed and machine-gunned from the air. This
went on intermittently all the following week at Djebel Abiod,
plus more than enough shelling. Since then, the men have dug
slit trenches automatically, even if they arrive at a place soaking
wet at three in the morning. Their trenches are a full 5 feet
deep, too. Anyone will tell you tales of miraculous escapes due
to slit trenches — shells landing a couple of feet away without
hurting the bloke inside, and so on. I don’t think you could
ever shell our battalion out of a position — if only because we
know we are safer in slit trenches than out of them.

Incidentally, machine-gunning from the air is perfectly
bloody — worse than bombing or shelling. The accuracy of it is
something I never imagined. An unopposed fighter can
guarantee that he’ll hit a solitary car. But, on the other hand,
if you have dug good slit trenches, you don’t suffer casualties
from this type of attack, and you find that, after all, the noise
was the worst part of it.

UNITED NATIONS — BRITISH COMBAT EXPERIENCES 79

The Boche does much more air reconnaissance than we do.
Every morning “Gert and Daisy” take a look at us, and if
camouflage is bad, I suppose a photo of our positions goes into
the album. You can almost tell how long a unit has been out
here by looking at its camouflage.

It is worth learning something about antitank mines. There
are usually plenty to be had, and if all your men can lay them,
you are ready for the enemy’s tanks almost as soon as you get
into a new position. If you’re lazy and wait for the Royal
Engineers to lay them, you may never be ready! All our men
carry Hawkins antitank grenade-mines.

Somebody once said, “Warfare consists of boredom punctuated
by occasional moments of excitement.” This is absolute rot!
When you’re living out in shocking weather, with nothing but a
gas cape over your head and with thirty men expecting you to
okay their letters for censorship, dish out NAAFI (Navy, Army,
and Air Force Institutes) stuff, make the best of the rations, and
get them gear from the “Q,” there’s too much to do to get bored.
When you, in turn, have got to see that “they are always ready
to fight, that they are in good heart, that they are clean and
healthy, and that the noncoms are doing their jobs, you may get
fed up but never bored. Discipline is the hardest and most
important thing to keep going. You and the noncoms spend 24
hours a day with the men, and discipline is almost certain to
slacken if you’re not on your guard. I find that the best way is
to keep a strict routine, however rotten the conditions. That is,
I stipulate a definite timetable for everything which must be done
daily. If you keep a firm hold on the men in these small day-to-
day things, you’ll find that you’ve got them under control when
the trouble starts.

Finally, remember that “there are bad officers but no bad
troops.” This is horribly true. We have often seen it out here —
second-rate men fighting magnificently because they were under
a first-rate officer, and vice versa. It makes you realize the vital
importance of your job. Motto — “It all depends on me.”

Section III. DESCRIPTION OF BRITISH
ANTIPERSONNEL SWITCH

1. INTRODUCTION

In Tunisia the Axis made liberal use of captured
British antipersonnel switches. This switch is a device
intended to he sunk in footpaths and trails. When
pressure is put upon it and then released, a bullet is
projected upward. The following notes on the weapon
are reproduced from a British Army training pamphlet.

2. DESCRIPTION

The switch (see fig. 19) consists of a hollow metal spike (1)
with a flange at the open end. The spike can be pressed into the
ground or hammered with care into a road. Inside the spike is
the firing assembly, consisting of a metal spindle (2) with a flange
at the base and a wire umbrella catch toward the top. A spring
(3) and a spring retaining sleeve (4) are threaded over the spindle
and are held in compression by the umbrella catch. A striker
with a hollow shaft (5) is placed over the top of the spindle.
Resting on the striker is a rimless cartridge with a bullet (6),
which projects slightly above the spike.

3. OPERATION

When a man’s foot (or a tire) depresses the bullet, the striker
moves down and releases the umbrella catch. The striker then

UNITED NATIONS BR1TISI

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

drives up under the influence of the spring, striking the cartridge
cap and firing the bullet, which goes through the man’s foot (or
the tire).

4. ASSEMBLY AND TESTING

The switches will normally be issued in boxes of 50, with the
cartridges packed separately. The firing mechanism, which is
inserted in the hollow spike, is kept in position by means of
a cork.

Should the mechanism not be loaded, place the sleeve — with the
rounded end in contact with the spring and the faced end toward
the striker — over the spindle, and depress until the catch engages.
If difficulty is experienced in getting the catch to hold, it should
be pried open a little further with a small screw driver. The
striker can then be placed on the spindle.

To test the mechanism, push a pencil down the spike.

Never use the oartridge for testing !

5. CONCEALMENT

When the switch has been sunk into the ground, its protruding
point may be concealed with a handful of dirt, sand, mud, a few
leaves, or whatever blends best with the locality. A shallow
water-filled pothole in a road is an excellent site, provided that
the bullet’s nose is beneath the surface of the water. In this case,
however, the switch quickly rusts and becomes inoperative.

INDEX1

Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 1, Nos. 1-12

GERMANY

General:

Attacks on concrete fortifications,
6 : 42-43.

British junior officer tells combat
experience in North Africa,
12 : 75-79.

Combat in woods, 8 :1-14.

Defense of villages, 10:36-37.

Defensive ruses (North Africa),
8: 21.

Delaying tactics (Tripolitania),
11 : 51-53.

Dogs, use of, 2 : 21-23.

Fifth Column, 3 : 22-26.

German-Italian relations, 2 : 24-25.

The individual soldier, 3 : 1-11.

Map signs for obstacles, 6 : 65.

Reaction to British use of smoke,
10 : 34.

Reconnaissance units, 3 : 12-16.

Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin —
Biographical note, 2 : 92.

Static defenses (North Africa),
8 : 19-20.

Training methods, 1 : 36-39.

Air :

Air-ground recognition in desert
warfare, 2 : 16-17.

Dive bombing, 2 : 11-14.

Dornier 217E bomber, 7 : 54-55.

Flying discipline, 8 : 26-28.

Focke-Wulf— FW190, 1 : 12.

Ground-attack tactics, 10 : 24r-28.

Air — Continued.

Henschel 129 bomber, 7 : 51-54.

Interrogation of prisoners,
10 : 28-30.

Junkers (Ju) 88, 4:39—41.

Parachute troops, 1 : 13-20 ; 3 : 6- 7 ;
9 : 46-48.

Substratosphere planes, 3 : 27-28.

Tactics against ground forces,
8 : 22-26.

Visual signals between air and
ground forces, 7 : 38-42.

Winter flying problems, 6 : 52-62.

Antiaircraft :

Antiaircraft artillery, use of,
3 : 19-20.

Barrage balloons, use of, 3 : 21.

Defense against aircraft, 3 : 17-21.

Defense against ground-attack
planes, 9 : 43-45.

88-mm AA/AT gun, 1 : 1-4 ; 9 : 59.

Flak in the field, 10 : 34—36.

Searchlights, use of, 3 : 17-19.

Small arms antiaircraft tactics,
4 : 81-82.

20-mm AA/AT gun against ground
targets, use of, 6 : 38-41.

Antitank :

Antitank guns, 9 : 53-55.

Antitank protection, balanced,
2 : 19-20.

Antitank weapons and their use,
12 : 23-31.

1 The numeral to the left of the colon denotes the Bulletin number, and the numerals
to the right denote the page numbers.

INDEX

Antitank — Continued.

Defensive AT methods (Russia),
proposed, 8 : 18-19.

88-mm AA/AT gun, 1 : 1-4 ; 9 : 59.

50-mm antitank gun, 6 : 31-37.

75-mm antitank gun, new
11 : 38-41.

75-mm assault artillery, 11 : 32-37.

Tactics as seen by U. S. combat
personnel, 11 : 27-31.

Tank hunters, 12 : 19-32.

20-mm AA/AT guns against ground
targets, use of, 6 : 38-41.

Armored Force :

Ammunition supply for tanks,
4 : 32-33.

Armored-car tactics, 4 : 32.

Counterattack tactics (Mareth
Front), 10:31-33.

Destruction of motor vehicles,
8 : 40-41.

Engaging a British observation
post, 10 : 33.

Field patching of armored per-
sonnel carriers, 6 : 63-64.

Flame-throwing tank, 9 : 62-63.

Heavy tank, new, 10 : 19-23.

Mechanized warfare, 1 : 7-10.

Motorized reconnaissance units,
3 : 14-15.

Night driving equipment, 1 : 40-42.

Notes from North African theater,
4 : 32-33.

Panzer Grenadiers, 9:19-52,
10 : 32-33.

Pz. Kw. (Mark) 4 tank, operating
the, 4:35-38.

Pz. Kw. 4 (with short 75-mm gun ) ,
tactics used by, 11 : 42-47.

Reconnaissance by light tank pla-
toons, 9 : 31-35.

“Secret" weapon, 1 : 48-51.

Smoke against tanks, use of,
7 : 58-60.

Armored Force — Continued.

Speed of vehicles, 2 : 24.

Suggestions for drivers in Libya,
4 : 28-31.

Tactics in the Middle East,
6 : 44-51.

Tactics (Russia), recent develop-
ments in, 8 : 15-18.

Tank and artillery tactics, 2 : 15.

Tank-borne infantry, 10 : 33-34.

Tank guns, 9 : 55-58.

Tank maintenance and recovery,
4 : 33 ; 8 : 34-39.

Tank recognition, 9 : 61-62.

Tanks in spotlight, 1 : 4-7.

Tanks, use of, 4 : 51-52.

Tanks with infantry, methods of
employing, 11 : 1-17.

“Ten commandments” for using
tanks, 11 : 53-54.

Transportation and desert war-
fare, 2 : 17.

Uniforms, 3 : 6.

Artillery :

75-mm assault artillery, 11 : 32-37.

Tactics, 10 : 14-18.

Tactics (North Africa), recent de-
velopments in, 8 : 15.

Chemical Warfare :

Blister gas, treatment for, 4 : 52-
53.

Gas warfare, 7 : 31-37.

Smoke, use of, 5 : 15-20.

Smoke against tanks, use of, 7 : 58-
60.

Desert Warfare:

Developments in desert warfare,
2 : 15 18.

Hints for soldiers in Libya, 4 : 24-

31.

Minefields in desert terrain, 5 : 7-
14.

INDEX

Engineers :

Assault tactics, 12 : 33-37.

Attacks on concrete fortifications,
6 : 42-43.

Booby traps, 1 : 21-33 ; 8:21;

10 : 1-13 ; 12 : 1-6.

Breaking trails through minefields.
2: 16.

Combat engineers, 2 : 7-9.

Defensive ruses (North Africa),
8: 21.

Demolition precautions, 10 : 37-38.

Engineer organizations, 2 : 10.

Land mines, 1 : 34-36 ; 5 : 7-14 ;
10 : 1-13 ; 12 : 1-18.

Light assault bridge, 7 : 56-58.

Minefields in desert terrain, 5 : 7-
14.

Mines and booby traps, recent
trends in use of, 10 : 1-13.

Obstructing airdomes, methods of,
11 : 48-51.

Static defenses (North Africa),
8 : 19-20.

Tellermines, “S” mines, and notes
on their use, 12 : 7-18.

TJ. S. wounded discuss Axis mines,
booby traps, 12 : 1-6.

Infantry :

Attack methods, 2 : 2-5.

British junior officer tells com-
bat experiences, 12 : 75-79.

Company orders ( defense ) 9 : 36-
42.

Counterattack tactics (Mareth
Front), 10: 31-32.

Deception, 2 : 6.

Fieldworks, 7 : 43-46.

Fire fight, the, 8 : 42-46.

Infantry division, 2 : 1-6.

Reconnaissance units, 3 : 15.

Static defenses (North Africa),
8: 19-20.

Infantry — Continued.

Tactics, 5 : 1-6.

Tank-borne infantry, 10 : 33-34.

Tanks with infantry, methods of
employing, 11 : 1-17.

Village fighting, 5 : 5-6.

Medical :

Blister gas, treatment for, 4:52-
53.

Hints for soldiers in Libya, 4 : 24-
27.

Military Intelligence :

German prisoners, intelligence
from, 4 : 47-50.

Instructions in case of capture,
1 : 43-47 ; 12 : 38-40.

Interrogation of British prisoners
of war, 7 : 47-50.

Interrogation of United Nations
air-force prisoners, 10 : 28-30.

Interrogation procedure, 4 : 34.

Prisoners of war, 4 : 42-50.

Prisoners’ ruse, 12 : 40.

Security in the field, 5 : 28.

Mountain Warfare :

Combat in high mountains, 11 : 18-
23.

Ordnance :

Antitank and tank guns, 9 : 53-58.

88-mm AA/AT gun, 1:1-4; 9 : 59.

50-mm antitank gun, 6 : 31-37.

50-mm light mortar, 5 : 21-27.

Gun-howitzer (standard 105-mm).
German, 8 : 29-33.

Heavy antiaircraft guns, 3 : 19-20.

Light antiaircraft cannon, 3 : 20.

Machine gun, new, 9 : 60-61.

Roving guns, use of, 12 : 40-41.

75-mm antitank gun, new, 11 : 38-
41.

75-mm assault artillery, 11 : 32-37.

Tank-hunting weapons and their
use, 12 : 23-31.

INDEX

Ordnance — Continued.

20-mm AA/AT gun against ground
targets, use of, 6 : 38-41.
Parachute Troops : see AIR.
Quartermaster :

Night driving equipment, 1 : 40-42.
Supply in desert warfare, 2 : 18.
Uniforms, insignia, and distin-
guishing marks, 3 : 5-11 ; 8 : 41-
42 ; 12 : 32.

Signal Corps :

Air-ground recognition, 2:36-17.

General :

German-Italian relations, 2 : 24-25.
Individual soldier, the, 4 : 54-64.
Air:

Torpedo bombers, 5 : 59-61.
Armored Force :

Flame-thrower tank, 4 : 67-68.
Artillery :

Weapons most frequently used,
3 : 59-60.

Engineers :

B2 antitank mine and B4 antiper-
sonnel mine, 12 : 42—15.

Signal Corps — Continued.

Radio communication in North
Africa, 4 : 34.

Visual signals between air and
ground forces, 7 : 38-42.

Task Forces :

“Secret” weapon, 1 : 48-51.
Training, 1 : 36-39.

Winter Warfare :

Combat in snow and extreme cold,
11 : 23-26.

Winter flying problems, 6 : 52-62.

Infantry :

Attack, notes on, 12 : 46-47.
Flame thrower, 4 : 65-67.

Weapons most frequently used,
3 : 55-58.

Ordnance :

81-mm mortar, 5 : 55-58.

Flame throwers, 4 : 65-68.
Weapons most frequently used,
3 : 55-60.

Quartermaster :

Uniforms and insignia, 4 : 60-64.
Signal Corps :

Radio transmission, 3 : 61-62.

JAPAN

General :

American wounded tell about Jap-
anese on Attu, 12 : 48-53.
Characteristics of Japanese, 2 : 27-
35 ; 3 : 29-30, 35-36 ; 5 : 37, 42-52 ;

6 : 9-11, 18-26, 29-30 ; 7 : 27-28 ;
8 : 55-57 ; 9 :l-4, 27-29 ; 10 :80-82.

Deceptions, ruses, and Fifth Col-
umn, 1 : 59-66 ; 3 : 32, 37 ; 4 : 7-9 ;
5 : 39 ; 7 : 26-27 ; 9 : 12 : 10 : 69-72.
Defense, 3 : 39 ; 4:11; 6 : 13-15 :

7 : 29-30 ; 9 : 8-11 ; 10 : 65-69,

General — Continued.

78-79 ; 11 : 65-67, 70-71 ; 12 : 61-
64.

Festivals and holidays, 3 : 53-54.
General instructions, 11 : 76.

How the Japanese treat natives in
S. W. Pacific, 8:67-69.

New Guinea fighting, noncom tells
experiences in, 11 : 59-63.

Night operations, 3 : 32, 38, 44-51 ;
4 : 10-11 ; 5 : 38 ; 6:7-9; 7 : 15 ;
9:7-8; 10:75-76.

INDEX

General — Continued.

Reverses in S. W. Pacific, Japanese
explanation of, 8 : 70-71.

Road-movement abilities of units,
11 : 73.

Tactics, general, 3 : 33-34 ; 4 : 2-13 ;
5 : 40-41 ; 7 : 23-25 ; 10 : 65-79 ;
11 : 59-63.

U. S. warfare, estimate of, 5 : 29-
36; 6:17; 7:1-4; 8:57-58.

Ant:

Cooperation with ships and land
forces, 8 : 53-54.

Fighting in the Solomon Islands,
4 : 11-12.

Land-air liaison, 7 : 17-21.

“O” fighter, 1 : 74-76.

Supplies by air, 1 : 74.

Tactics, 1 : 70-74.

Amphibious Forces :

Instructions to landing parties,
6 : 15-16.

Landing operations, 1 : 59.

Notes on boats and ships in am-
phibious operations, 10 : 56-64.

Rubber boats, 8 : 60.

Tactics based on experiences at
Wake, 8:47-54.

Antiaircraft :

AA guns, 8 : 72-76.

Defense against air-borne troops,
8:60.

Defense against aircraft, 11 : 75.

Antitank :

Fighting in the Solomon Islands,
4:6-7.

Magnetic mines, 1 : 58.

Obstacles, 4 : 17-18.

Armored Force :

Road-movement abilities of ve-
hicles, 11 : 74.

Tankette (light tank), 4 : 22-23.

Transportation in Burma, 3 : 33.

Artillery :

Effect of, 7 : 28-29.

Offense, 10 : 77-78.

Tactics, 2 : 39.

Cavalry :

Burma Campaign, 3 : 33.

Chemical Warfare :

Bomb, new, 1 : 69.

Gas mask, new, 2 : 47-48.

Poison gas, training in use of,
2 : 42 ; 12 : 54-59.

Protection against gas, 3 : 52-53.
Smoke, use of, 2 : 42 ; 10 : 39-55.
Water purifier, 1 : 68.

Engineers :

Bangalore torpedo, 10 : 83-84.
Camouflage, 3 : 37-3S ; 4 : 9-10 ;

11 : 67.

Electric obstacles, 4 : 18-19.

Land mines, 8 : 61.

Magnetic mines, 1 : 58.

Obstacles, 4 : 15-19.

Pillboxes, notes on how Japanese
attack, 12 : 54-60.

Road blocks, 3 : 31-32 ; 4 : 15-17.
Infantry :

Attack techniques, 7 : 25-26 ; 8 : 59.
Bivouac defenses, 5 : 38-39.

Burma Campaign, 3 : 29-34.

Close combat, pointers on, 6:11-

12.

Defense against air-borne troops,
8: 60.

Defense positions on the Arakan
Front, 11 : 70-71.

Defense positions on the Attu
Front, 11:64-67.

Defensive tactics, 3 : 39.

Defensive techniques, 12 : 61-64.
Deployment tactics, 6 : 3-4.

Flame throwers, 8 : 62-66.

Ground forces, 1 : 52-69.

Ground forces in China, 2 : 41-42.
Infiltration, 1 : 54-57 ; 3 : 38 ; 4 : 2-3.

INDEX

Infantry — Continued.

Patrols, 10 : 74-75.

Pillboxes, notes on how the Japa-
nese attack, 12 : 54-60.

Reconnaissance, 4 : 2.

Shock troops, 3 : 30.

Sniping, 3 : 36-37 ; 4 : 3-5 ; 9 : 12.

Tactics in Philippines, 2 : 37-39.

Jungle Warfare:

Approach tactics, 6 : 1-3.

Asaulting enemy positions, 7 : 16.

Combat tactics, 6 : 4-5.

Ground forces, 1 : 52-69.

Instructions to troops, 3 : 41^3.

Jungle-clearing units, 10 : 85.

Marching through jungle, 6 : 6-7.

Movement in jungle country, 1 : 53 ;
7 : 13-15.

Night attacks, 6 : 7-9 ; 7 : 15.

Offense, as seen by U. S. observers,
9:4-8.

Medical :

Comment by prisoners, 6 : 29.

Medical care in the Solomon Is-
lands, 4 : 13.

Military Intelligence :

American wounded tell about
Japanese on Attu, 12 : 48-53.

British prisoners, report by, 4 : 20-

21.

Comments by prisoners, 6 : 27-
30.

Conclusions of TJ. S. marines based
on fighting in Solomons, 5 : 40-
41.

Intelligence notes from Japanese
documents, 10 : 79-80.

Japanese prisoners, information
obtained from, 9 : 27-30.

IJew Guinea fighting, noncom tells
experiences in, 11 : 59-63.

Prisoners, 4 : 12-13 ; 11 : 55-58.

Security, 6 : 16-17 ; 8 : 58-59 ;

10 : 86 ; 12 : 65-71.

Ordnance :

Comment by prisoners regarding
equipment and supplies, 6 : 28-
29.

Equipment, 5 : 39-40 ; 9 : 24-26 ;

1 : 66-69.

Equipment of ground forces, 2 : 40-
41, 42.

Flame throwers, 8 : 62-66.

Gas mask, new, 2 : 47-A8.

Grenade dischargers, 9 : 15-23.

Rifles, 1 : 66-67.

Rifle, details of new, 7 : 5-12.

Rifle, service, 5 : 53-54.

Swords, 1 : 67.

Weapons and equipment used in
attacks on pillboxes, 12 : 55-56.

Weapons in Burma Campaign, use
of, 3 : 30-31.

Weapons on Attu Front, 11 : 67-
68 ; 12 : 49-52.

Weapons used in Solomon Islands,
4:14.

Parachute Troops :

Equipment and supplies, 2 : 44-45.

Operations at Palembang, 2 : 45.

Operations on Timor, 2 : 43-45.

Organization, 2 : 43.

Quartermaster :

Comment by prisoners on equip-
ment and supplies, 6 : 28-29;
9 : 29-30.

Equipment, 10 : 84-85.

Equipment and supplies of para-
chute forces, 2 : 44-45.

Equipment for ground forces,
1:66-69 ; 2:41.

Equipment used on Attu Front,
11 : 68-70.

Information obtained from Japa-
nese prisoners regarding equip-
ment, 9 : 29-30.

INDEX

Quartermaster — Continued.

Rations, 1:77-79 ; 4:13.

Supplies by air, 1 ; 74.

Supply on Guadalcanal, 9 : 13-14.

Uniforms, 5 : 51-52.

UNITED

General :

British abbreviations, 2 ; 90-91.

British indoor war game, 5 : 81-85.

British junior officer tells combat
experiences, 12 : 75-79.

British terminology, 2 : 81-91.

British training notes, 6 : 76-88,
7 : 65-73.

British use of dogs, 5 : 66-70.

Dust, effect on men and equip-
ment, 4 : 84-87.

How to use your eyes at night,
6 : 66-75.

Life preserver, how to use trousers
as, 6 ; 89-91.

Maintaining direction, 4 : 69-78.

Moroccan soldier, the, 5 : 62-65.

Timoshenko, Field Marshal Sem-
yon— biographical note, 2 : 93.

Air;

Air-force expressions, British and
American, 2 : 85.

Antiaircraft ;

Light A A (New Zealand), notes
on, 10 ; 87-91.

Physical training notes for British
AA units, 9 : 79-83.

Small-arms AA fire, 4 : 79-83.

Antitank ;

British antitank tactics, notes on,
5 ; 78-80.

Russian antitank tactics, 5 : 71-77.

Russian use of antitank rifle,
3 : 81-82.

Armored Force:

British nicknames of tanks, 7 : 77.

Signal Corps :

Communications, 4 : 5-6 ; 7 : 17-21 ;
8:54.

NATIONS

Armored Force — Continued.

British armored units, “do's" and
“don’ts” for, 2 : 73-79.

Cavalry :

Russian cavalry, night combat by,
2 : 69-72.

Desert Warfare :

Maintaining direction, 4 : 77-78.
Some health rules for N. Africa-
Middle East, 9 : 65-78.
Engineers :

British antipersonnel switch,
12 : 81-82.

Camouflage, 2 : 49-68 ; 3 : C'3-80.
Road craters and obstacles, how
British deal with, 12 : 72-74.
Wire obstacles, how New Zealand
troops penetrate, 6 : 92-95.
Infantry ;

Some British trends in combat fir-
ing, 11 : 84-86.

Medical :

How to handle wounded in difficult
situations, 11 : 77-83.

Some health rules for N. Africa-
Middle East, 9 : 65-78.

Steel helmets and head wounds,
7 : 74-76.

Military Intelligence :

British army notes on embarka-
tion security, 10 : 92-93.
Security in the Middle East,
7 : 61-64.

Quartermaster :

Steel helmets and head wounds,
7 : 74-76.

U. S- GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE f 1943

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Full text of "1943-08 Intelligence Bulletin Vol 01 No 12"

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